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I. INTRODUCTION
A judge on a multimember appellate court can vote against the
result of his or her own reasoning by deferring to a majority on a
subissue on which the judge differs. When Justice White did just this
in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas,' soon followed by a similarly anoma-
lous vote by Justice Kennedy in Arizona v. Fulminante,2 I examined
the pool of United States Supreme Court cases in which this kind of
voting was possible.3 Out of more than one hundred fifty earlier cases
where one or more of the justices might have voted in such a way,
* Brown, Todd & Heyburn Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law. I would
like to thank Rutheford Campbell, Michael Healy, and Maxwell Stearns for making helpful
comments on earlier drafts (without necessarily agreeing with my arguments).
1. 491 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1989) (White, J., concurring in part).
2. 499 U.S. 279, 313-14 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
3. See John M. Rogers, 'T Vote This Way Because I'm Wrong". The Supreme Court
Justice as Epimenides, 79 Ky. L. J. 439 (1991).
997
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
only two justices in one 1971 case had cast such votes. 4 The votes of
Justice White in Union Gas and Justice Kennedy in Fulminante were
troubling, however, not because of their almost totally unprecedented
nature, but because they portended forfeiture of the Supreme Court's
claim-implicit in the fact that the Court issues opinions-to be
composed of reasoned, and not arbitrary, decision makers. There was
no tenable justification given for the anomalous votes in each case,
even though the votes finally decided the rights of the parties. Even
the smallest first step toward such arbitrariness as a basis for
decision should be more disturbing than any particular unfortunate
decision of the Court.
To be frank, when preparing my Article I had a lurking
concern that I was overreacting to some minor aberrations. Even the
greatest legal giants may stumble once or twice. 5 My own research
showed that the overwhelming practice of the justices on the Court
has been to vote for the consequence of the individual justice's own
reasoning. Imagine my surprise when Professors David Post and
Steven Salop argued in the Georgetown Law Journal that a judge
should always vote against his or her own view if a majority of
colleagues on the court disagrees with an essential step of the judge's
analysis.6 And consider my further surprise when Professors Lewis
Kornhauser and Lawrence Sager argued in the California Law
Review that courts should regularly engage in "metavotes" to
determine whether individual judges on a court should do what Post
and Salop say they should always do.7
The policies used to support these radical suggestions do not
stand up to practical scrutiny, and moreover, they raise tremendous
difficulties. Although my arguments have been foreshadowed or as-
4. See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 96 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 97-98
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Rogers, 79 Ky. L. J. at 461-63 (cited in note 3). Five additional
cases involved three-way choices for the Court, where at least one justice voted against his
position so that the Court could reach a judgment. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347
U.S. 409, 423 (1954) (plurality opinion); Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 619 (1949)
(Rutledge, J., concurring); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 726-27 (1948) (plurality opinion);
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 134 (1945) (Rutledge, J., concurring); Connecticut v.
Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 89-90 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). The imperative that the Court
reach some sort of judgment distinguishes these cases. See Rogers, 79 Ky. L. J. at 459-61 (cited
in note 3). See also text accompanying notes 117-18.
5. Compare National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 618 n.12
(opinion of Rutledge, J.) (1949) (noting that John Marshall's "master touch was lacking").
6. David Post and Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by
Multijudge Panels, 80 Georgetown L. J. 743 (1992).
7. Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in
Collegial Courts, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1993).
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serted before,8 the justification for the customary practice of outcome
voting-as opposed to "issue voting"-may be more compelling if set
forth in direct response to their contentions.
The question whether judges should vote by outcome or by
issue can arise when two or more issues of law must be resolved by a
multijudge court to reach judgment in a case, and there is a difference
in the identity of the judges who agree on each issue. This situation
generally exists in cases where there is a plurality decision and a
concurrence.9 In such cases, issue voting rather than the customary
practice could have led to a different result in well over one hundred
cases, and it would certainly have led to different results in twenty or
thirty supreme court cases. Professors Post, Salop, Kornhauser, and
Sager are thus proposing an enormously significant change.1°
Let us take an example to illustrate the problem. National
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.11 is perhaps the most
handy example, since it is not particularly complex, and both Post and
Salop (who urge issue voting in all cases)C and Kornhauser and Sager
8. See Rogers, 79 Ky. L. J. at 463-75 (cited in note 3).
9. Id. at 443-45. See also Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 29 (cited in note 7)
C'Any plurality opinion case is a paradoxical case lurking in disguise").
10. Professors Post and Salop state that "there is no hard-and-fast 'voting rule' to which
the Supreme Court consistently adheres" Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 755 (cited in
note 6). In their footnote listing examples of both outcome and issue voting, they describe four
cases as "outcome voting," while hundreds of examples are available. They list five examples of
"issue voting': the three anomalous cases dealt with in my earlier article (Union Gas,
Fulminante, and Vuitch), and two cases that instead are paradigm examples of outcome voting:
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. 759 (1969), and James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 748 n.19 (cited in note 6). See also id. at 750 n.30.
There are thus only three anomalous issue-voting instances in the U.S. Reports. Moreover,
as Professors Kornhauser and Sager point out, the issue voting of Justice White in Union Gas
and of Justice Kennedy in Fulminante can be contrasted with the outcome voting of the other
justices in each of those very cases. Kornhauser and Sager, 82 Cal. L. Rev. at 18-19 (cited in
note 7).
Professors Post and Salop also rely on some drafts leading up to the justices' decision in Bell
v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964), as described in Bernard Schwartz, Super Chief Earl Warren
and his Supreme Court. A Judicial Biography 508-25 (N.Y.U., 1983). One group of Justices, led
by Justice Black, proposed a dissenting statement using the logic of issue voting, based [in
Schwartz's words] "on the proposition that when a majority wanted to reach the constitutional
merits, the Court must do so." Id. at 521. Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Warren found the
implications of the proposed statement "absurd," and it was promptly dropped by the
proponents. Id. at 522. The final result was a majority opinion of the Court on one dispositive
issue, contrary to the description by Post and Salop. See Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at
755 (cited in note 6). The example at best shows a brief flirtation with an issue-voting notion by
some justices during internal jockeying on a politically sensitive case.
11. 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
12. Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 750 (cited in note 6).
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(who use Tidewater as a paradigm of when issue voting 13 should be
used) agree that the case should have been decided differently.14  In
Tidewater, the Supreme Court had to decide the constitutionality of a
statute granting diversity jurisdiction to federal district courts over
cases between citizens of the District of Columbia and citizens of a
state. A majority in two separate opinions held that Congress had the
power to grant such jurisdiction to federal district courts. 15  All
justices presumably accepted that the statute would be upheld if
Congress had the power to grant jurisdiction under either Article I or
Article III of the Constitution, and that the statute should be struck
down if neither article gave Congress such power. Three justices
found that the statute was constitutional based on Article I, but not
authorized by Article 111,16 two justices found that the statute was
constitutional based on Article III, but not on Article 1.1 Since five
justices found that the statute was supported by Article I or Article
III, the statute was upheld and the party favoring federal jurisdiction
prevailed.
What exactly is the harm here that demands a different result?
It can be stated simply: a separate majority agreed with each step of
a syllogism that leads to the opposite result. That is, six justices
agreed that Article I did not support jurisdiction, seven justices
agreed that Article III did not support jurisdiction, and all
presumably agreed that if neither Article I nor Article III supported
jurisdiction there was no jurisdiction. We can call this situation a
"disgrace to the judicial process," 8  "fundamentally flawed,"' 9
"distinctly troublesome,"20 an "affront to the model of reasoned
justification,"21 or whatever epithet seems appropriate. But in reality
what is so bad about it?
Professors Post, Salop, Kornhauser, and Sager make four criti-
cisms of outcome voting:2 2 (1) less useful precedent is produced, 23 (2)
13. Professors Kornhauser and Sager use the term "issue-by-issue voting:' Kornhauser
and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 11 (cited in note 7).
14. Id. at 27; Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 750 (cited in note 6).
15. Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 583-604 (opinion of Jackson, J.); id. at 604-27 (Rutledge, J.,
concurring).
16. Id. at 585-603 (opinion of Jackson, J.).
17. Id. at 604-26 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
18. Lowry v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 707 F.2d 721, 743 (3rd Cir. 1983) (en banc),
quoted in Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 758 n.72 (cited in note 6).
19. Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 745 (cited in note 6).
20. Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 12 (cited in note 7).
21. Id. at 27.
22. Kornhauser and Sager used the term "case-by-case voting." Id. at 11.
23. Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 759, 761-62 (cited in note 6); Kornhauser and
Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 42-48 (cited in note 7).
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lawyers are encouraged to make insubstantial arguments,24 (3) subse-
quent cases in which only one of the issues is raised will be decided
differently, leading to a type of objectionable inconsistency in the
law,25 and (4) outcome voting is "path dependent."2 6 Before responding
to these arguments, we should first examine the proposed alternative
to outcome voting, since the cure to any problem should not be worse
than the disease.27
II. PROBLEMS WITH ISSUE VOTING
The alternative proposed by Professors Post and Salop is issue
voting, defined by them as:
[H]av[ing] the court as a whole collectively assess each of the legal issues
raised in the case and reach collective decisions on each of those issues, again
by majority vote. The court's judgment then would be determined by the result
it reached on each of the underlying issues.
28
Professors Post and Salop do not explain who will determine what the
"underlying issues" are, however.29 And while Professors Kornhauser
and Sager argue that such issue voting is sometimes proper and
sometimes not, they give no elaboration of how underlying issues will
be ascertained in those cases where issue voting is proper.30 The
question presents no small problem.
24. Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 760 (cited in note 6).
25. Id. at 764-70; Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 25, 27 (cited in note 7).
26. Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 762-64 (cited in note 6); Kornhauser and Sager,
81 Cal. L. Rev. at 36-39 (cited in note 7).
27. Or in public policy jargon, we should avoid the "nirvana fallacy" of comparing existing
institutions with nirvana rather than with real alternatives. See Maxwell L. Stearns, The
Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 Yale L. J. 1219, 1230 n.33 (1994), borrowing the
term from Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J. L. & Econ. 1
(1969).
28. Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 744 (cited in note 6).
29. They do "recognize that [what determines an issue] is a troublesome question," but
they avoid it with an invitation to "further work to refine the analysis." Id. at 772. They wish-
fully suggest that "there will often be consensus," and suggest that subissues that "will never
arise independently" should not be voted on separately. Id. at 772-73. They do not indicate
what the procedure would be to make such a decision.
30. Like Post and Salop, Professors Kornhauser and Sager recognize the problem but
suggest no solution beyond saying that "a decision that issue-by-issue adjudication is the appro-
priate procedure requires that the court also specify the issues and ensure that each judge
faithfully reports her views on each relevant issue." Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at
49 (cited in note 7).
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When voting by outcome, individual justices decide what issues
they deem to be relevant or dispositive, but when all judges are to
vote on the same underlying issues, who decides which issues get a
vote? None of the four advocates of issue voting suggests how issues
will be determined for the collective issue-vote. My attempt to parse
all of the United States Supreme Court's plurality decisions3' made it
very clear to me that in most of these cases there was more than one
way to state the relevant subissues. There is also the problem of sub-
subissues, and sub-sub-subissues. How deep should we go? How
many votes should we have? And who is going to outline which issues
underlie which other issues?
To show the seriousness of the problem, we need only look at
Tidewater itself, a case in which all four proponents of change support
issue voting. What follows is a list of most of the issues presented in
Tidewater, followed by the number of votes for and against the issue.32
That the reader may find more, or fewer, or differently stated issues
only strengthens my point.33
Issues on which justices disagreed in Tidewater:
A. Is a statute giving federal court jurisdiction over
controversies between D.C. citizens and citizens of a state
within the constitutional power of Congress? (5 yes, 4 no)
B. Is a D.C. citizen a citizen of a "State" under Article III?
(2 yes, 7 no)
C. Can Congress confer the jurisdiction of federal courts
under Article I beyond the limits of Article III? (3 yes, 6 no)
D. Should the relevant provisions of the Constitution be
given a strict (not broad) interpretation? (4 yes, 5 no)
31. See Rogers, 79 Ky. L. J. at 442-56 (cited in note 3).
32. Professors Post and Salop simply assert that the case "raised two issues." Post and
Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 748 (cited in note 6).
33. An outline of the issues as treated in the four opinions in Tidewater is attached as an
Appendix. The outline is cross-referenced by letter to the list that follows in the text. I have
listed the issues here based on the criteria (1) that the issue was, for at least some of the
justices, part of the reasoning toward their decisions, and (2) that there was express or implicit
disagreement on the issue among the justices.
1002 [Vol. 49:997
RESPONSE TO ISSUE VOTING
E. Does a broad interpretation of the Constitution permit
Congress to enact the statute in question? (5 implicitly yes, 4
no opinion)34
F. Is it fair or unfair if the Constitution denies Congress the
power to give federal courts jurisdiction over controversies be-
tween D.C. citizens and citizens of a state? (5 unfair, 2 fair)
G. Should the Constitution be interpreted to avoid unfair
results? (5 implicitly yes, 4 no)
H. Is it consistent with Justice Marshall's opinion in
Hepburn to find a statute constitutional that gives federal
court jurisdiction over controversies between D.C. citizens
and citizens of a state?35 (3 yes, 2 [perhaps 6] no)
I. Should Hepburn be overruled? (2 yes, 7 implicitly no)
J. Should the Court defer to Congress regarding the
meaning of the asserted limits in Article III? (3 yes, 2 no)
K. Can we ascertain the Framers' intent on whether "State"
in Article III includes D.C.? (7 yes, 2 no)
L. Should words in the Constitution be construed to have
consistent meanings? (5 yes, 2 no)
M. Do the justiciability limits on federal courts derive from
Article III? (6 yes, 3 no)
N. Is the rationale for giving D.C. federal courts the power
to carry out legislative and administrative acts limited to
federal courts sitting in D.C.? (4 yes, 3 no)
34. Because four justices did not appear to reach this issue, it perhaps does not belong on
the list under my criteria for inclusion. It is helpful for a later point that I make, however.
35. There is certainly no reason that the question of what an earlier case holds cannot be
an issue in a subsequent case. See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1997, 2014 n.63 (1994).
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0. Do United States District Courts exercise Article I or
Article III power when they entertain suits against the
United States? (3 Art. I, 6 Art. III)
P. Do United States District Courts exercise Article I or
Article III power when they entertain bankruptcy trustee
suits arising under state law? (3 Art. I, 4 Art. III)
Q. In order for a case to "arise under" federal law for
constitutional purposes, must federal law be an element in
the cause of action? (3 yes, 2 no)
Do Professors Post, Salop, Kornhauser, and Sager seriously
suggest that there be votes on each of these issues? If so, who gets to
decide the sequence of the votes? Indeed, how can the Court a priori
ascertain which subissues and sub-subissues will have disagreement
at all?
One possible answer is to say that the court should just go "one
level down." If the Court engages in outcome voting, in effect it re-
fuses to divide issues at all. The overall issue in Tidewater, for in-
stance, is (A) whether a statute giving federal courts jurisdiction over
controversies between D.C. citizens and citizens of a state is within
the constitutional power of Congress? Going one level down in
Tidewater, the justices would vote, for instance, only on two immedi-
ately underlying issues. For instance, the justices could vote on (B)
whether a D.C. citizen is a citizen of a "State" under Article III, and
(C) whether Congress, under Article I, can confer jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts beyond the limits of Article III? All Justices presumably
agreed that a positive answer to either B or C would lead to upholding
the statute in question, while answering both B and C in the negative
would mean the statute was not constitutional.
Going one level down would mean not voting separately on the
issues underlying issues B and C. For instance, no vote would occur
on the following issues that underlie issue B: (K) whether we can
ascertain the Framers' intent on whether "State" in Article III in-
cludes D.C., and (L) whether words in the Constitution should be
construed to have consistent meanings. Nor would votes occur on the
following issues that underlie issue C: (M) whether the justiciability
limits on federal courts derive from Article III, and (P) whether
United States District Courts exercise Article I or Article III power
when they entertain bankruptcy trustee suits arising under state law.
Going in turn even deeper, the issues underlying issue P might
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include (Q) whether federal law must be an element in the cause of
action in order for a case to "arise under" federal law for
constitutional purposes.
There are two problems with going only one level down. First,
all of the problems that the critics have with outcome voting apply
just as strongly if outcome voting is pushed just one level down. To be
consistent, the critics must urge issue voting "all the way down"-that
is, on every issue where there might be disagreement. The agenda
manipulation problems with such a proposal are enormous, however.
Whoever gets to structure the sequence of votes would be able to
preordain the desired answer.
Second, even if issue voting were to go only one level down to
the major subissues, and not to all the possible issues that underlie
issues that underlie issues, justices will not necessarily agree on what
the major underlying issues are. In Tidewater, for instance, the
critics assume that the two underlying issues are whether Congress
had the power to enact the statute under Article III, and whether
Congress had the power to enact the statute under Article I (that is,
issues B and C above). All justices agreed that if Congress had the
power under neither, then the statute was unconstitutional, and that
power under either article would render the statute constitutional.
But the overall issue, whether Congress had the power to pass the
statute (issue A), could easily be considered to have different major
subissues.
For instance, all the justices would presumably agree that if
the constitutional limits on the judicial power are to be construed
broadly and not strictly (issue D), and a broad construction permits
Congress to pass this statute (issue E), then the statute is con-
stitutional. Issue voting on these underlying issues would lead to the
conclusion that the statute was constitutional, since there were five
votes for D and E.
Similarly, the overall issue of whether the statute is constitu-
tional would be completely controlled by the following two issues:
whether Justice Marshall's holding in Hepburn forbids the statute in
question (issue H), and whether Hepburn should be overruled (issue
I). Justice Rutledge's concurring opinion, for instance, is organized
this way.36 His position is that Hepburn requires a finding that the




Frankfurter and Vinson can be read to agree. His second point, that
Hepburn should be overruled, appears to be opposed by all the other
justices. Adding the issues in the manner that Professors Post and
Salop propose, we get the result that the statute is not constitutional.
There is even another possibility. The following two-part syllo-
gism leads to the conclusion that the statute is constitutional:
invalidating the statute is unfair (issue F), and the Constitution
should be interpreted to avoid unfair results (issue G). There are five
votes for each part of this syllogism, and under issue voting the
statute would be constitutional.
So under issue voting the result in Tidewater depends on
which major underlying issues are subjected to votes. The statute is
not constitutional if the relevant syllogism is: Article I does not allow
jurisdiction (6 votes), and Article III does not allow jurisdiction (7
votes), therefore the statute is unconstitutional. The statute is also
not constitutional if the relevant syllogism is: Hepburn requires
finding the statute unconstitutional (6 votes), and Hepburn should not
be overruled (7 votes), therefore the statute is not constitutional. But
the statute is constitutional if the relevant syllogism is: the
applicable constitutional provisions should be construed broadly (5
votes), and a broad interpretation permits this statute (presumably 5
votes), therefore the statute is constitutional. And the statute is also
constitutional if the relevant syllogism is: the fair result is that the
statute is constitutional (5 votes), and the constitution should be
interpreted to reach the fair result (5 votes).
Who is to say which is the controlling way to break down the
issues? Since the proponents of change have given us no clue, we
should at the outset be dubious.37 Let us now look at the bases of
criticism of the almost universal practice of outcome voting.
37. In their reply to this Article, Professors Post and Salop put forth an attempt to answer
the question. According to them, issues should be voted upon separately if they are "logically
independent" and "potentially dispositive." David G. Post and Steven C. Salop, Issues and
Outcomes, Guidance, and Indeterminacy: A Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others, 49
Vand. L. Rev. 1069, 1078 (1996). Even a cursory attempt to apply this standard to the issues
identified in Tidewater shows the indeterminate nature of the test. Tidewater issues B and C
are said to pass the test, while the remaining issues are said to fail. Id. at 1080 n.31. But D
through Q are said to fail the test because they are not "capable, standing alone, of disposing of
the overall question whether the statute before the Court is constitutional." Id. Of course,
answering B or C in the negative will also not dispose of the overall question. But according to
Professors Post and Salop, because answering yes to either questions B or C will resolve the
case, this disjunctivity distinguishes B and C from issues D and E, which both must be
answered to resolve the case. Similarly, F and G are said both to require answers to resolve the
case. Id. But any syllogism that requires X and Y for result R can be restated as requiring the
opposite result if there is either not-X or not-Y. Rogers, 79 Ky. L. J. at 444 (cite in note 3). In
other words, if an appellate result requires both of two premises to be demonstrated, the
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III. SUPPOSED PROBLEMS WITH OUTCOME VOTING
A. Usable Precedent
Professors Post and Salop argue that outcome voting often
results in plurality opinions, which "lack[ ] the full force of law"8 and
lead to a "reduction in usable output" by courts.39  Professors
Kornhauser and Sager make the analogous argument that cases like
Tidewater hurt "the orderly development of legal doctrine."40
Actually, plurality opinions, plus the concurrences needed to reach a
majority, together have the full force of law.41 Lawyers and judges
applying the plurality plus the concurrence must examine how the
authors of each opinion would resolve the case, thus multiplying the
number of opinions that must be analyzed to determine the effect of
the precedent, but in no way making it more difficult to examine the
effect of each particular opinion. For instance, in a case arising after
Tidewater, perhaps involving a statute that makes a territory other
than the District of Columbia a state for diversity jurisdiction
purposes, the lower court would have to examine each of the four
opinions to see how the justices would vote in the new case. For any
one of the four opinions, the endeavor would be no more difficult than
if that opinion had been the unanimous opinion in Tidewater. (It
might be four times the work to do this, of course.) Once the four
opposite result is required by the rejection, of either premise, id. at 444, and either issue is then
"capable, standing alone, of disposing of the overall question," Post and Salop, 49 Vand. L. Rev.
at 1080 n.31.
For his part, Professor Stearns in his reply simply denies that D, E, F, G, K, and L are
"really issues." See Maxwell L. Stearns, How Outcome Voting Promotes Principled Issue
Identification: A Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1045, 1065
(1996). A look at my Appendix will show that many of the justices in Tidewater must have
disagreed with him, since they resolved the questions as integral parts of their analyses, and it
is sufficient for my purposes to demonstrate that reasonable people will disagree on what are
relevant issues.
38. Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 759 (cited in note 6).
39. Id. See also id. at 761-62.
40. Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 25 (cited in note 7). In their view, outcome
voting in Tidewater could wreak havoc. Id. at 31, 35. Since there was outcome voting in
Tidewater, one wonders what havoc has been wreaked. See note 42 and accompanying text.
41. See also Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects
of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 46 (1994) ("[W]hen the Court produces a
fragmented-majority dispositional rule, meaning a majority of the Court has embraced the same
rule but in separate opinions, the rule has essentially the same predictive value as would a
unified-majority dispositional rule").
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outcomes are determined, the result has just as much force of law as
any precedent.
Professors Post and Salop in fact identify two court of appeals
decisions in which just this kind of analysis was made.42 In Siegmund
v. General Commodities Corp., the Ninth Circuit separately applied
Justice Jackson's and Justice Rutledge's opinions in Tidewater to
conclude that a statutory extension of diversity jurisdiction to citizens
of the Territory of Hawaii was constitutional. The court applied the
first two Tidewater opinions to the case before it, and the opinion
displayed not the slightest sign of the "court's discomfort in trying to
wrest workable precedent from Tidewater" that Post and Salop say is
"capparent to any reader."43 Post and Salop call the opinion "an exer-
cise of somewhat tortured logic,"44 and "a curious head-counting exer-
cise,"45 but these are just epithets.46 The result may not fit coherently
with other decisions in which only one of the subissues in Tidewater is
raised, but that is a problem of coherence in the law, not with the
usability of precedents. 47
Professors Post, Salop, Kornhauser, and Sager also seek to
mystify what a lower court is supposed to do on remand from a deci-
sion like Tidewater. Of course in Tidewater the lower court can
simply find jurisdiction and try the case. Professors Post and Salop
posit a case in which a court majority finds an agency regulation
invalid on one or the other of two possible grounds, neither of which
alone commands a majority. One ground is a challenged agency
statistical technique; the other is the agency's failure to use notice
42. Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 767-69 & n.95 (cited in note 6) (citing
Siegmund v. General Commodities Corp., 175 F.2d 952 (9th Cir. 1949), and Detres v. Lions
Building Corp., 234 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1956)).
43. Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 767 (cited in note 6).
44. Id. Professors Post and Salop do challenge the logic of the Siegmund courts applica-
tion of Justice Rutledge's opinion in Tidewater, id. at 768 n.94, but this is the type of criticism
that would be just as applicable if Justice Rutledge's opinion had been the majority opinion of
the Supreme Court. In other words, the "logical fallacy" that Post and Salop find in the Ninth
Circuit's application of Justice Rutledge's opinion had nothing at all to do with the outcome
voting in Tidewater.
45. Id. at 769.
46. The Seventh Circuit in Detres found the Siegmund reasoning equally applicable in the
case of Puerto Rican citizens. 234 F.2d at 603. Other examples of lower court application of
"incoherent" supreme court holdings include: Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba
(Citibank 1), 406 U.S. 759 (1972)); Greene v. Teffeteller, 90 F. Supp. 387 (E.D. Tenn. 1950)
(applying Tidewater); Service Oil, Inc. v. North Dakota, 479 N.W.2d 815 (N.D. 1992) (applying
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990)).
47. Nor is there any reason that this method "can work only in those cases where the
Court has settled into a pattern of nested disagreement." Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L.
Rev. at 48 (cited in note 7). In other types of cases also, each opinion can be separately analyzed
and fairly applied as if it were the majority opinion of the court.
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and comment rule-making procedures. 4 Post and Salop then ask
what the poor agency is to do.49 "Should the challenged statistical
technique [one ground] be abandoned? Should a notice and comment
procedure [the other ground] be provided? Should both be done? The
outcome-voting procedure obviously results in a decision that provides
no guidance to the agency. 5° On the contrary, it is obvious that the
guidance is clear. The agency must do one or the other (or both).51
One can say that no individual judge would make such a decision, but
that is very different from saying there is no guidance from the court's
decision. 5
Moreover, there would be a problem with the usability of
precedents if a scheme of issue voting were adopted.53 Let us say that
48. Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 746-47 (cited in note 6).
49. Id. at 765.
50. Id.
51. Professors Kornhauser and Sager raise the identical problem using a criminal proce-
dure example. What if one judge on a three-judge panel says that piece of evidence f could not
be admitted under the Fourth Amendment, and a second judge says that piece of evidence g
could not be admitted under the Fifth Amendment? Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at
42-44 (cited in note 7). This is said to present the lower court with a "jumbled mandate[ ]," id. at
43, and a "messy... situation," id. at 44. Once again, however, the law is pretty clear: the
lower court must exclude one piece of evidence, the other, or both. And again, while this may
not be a desirable state of the law in terms of coherence, there is nothing unclear about the
mandate.
52. Professors Kornhauser and Sager come up with a hypothetical that is supposed to be
even more difficult. In a civil case on appeal before a three-member panel, suppose the trial
court admitted pieces of evidence j and k over the plaintiffs objection. The plaintiff loses, and
on appeal (only) one judge says piece of evidence j should be excluded, (only) one judge says
piece of evidence k should be excluded, and the remaining judge says both j and k should be
admitted. Id. at 44. On remand, the trial judge is simply precluded from admitting both j and
k. But what if each of the judges who says that certain evidence need not be excluded also
believes that such evidence must be admitted if proffered? In that circumstance the lower court
is in a quandary: rejecting j or k on remand will now also result in reversal. According to
Kornhauser and Sager, such a situation will result in "an endless loop of reversals." Id. The
absence of citation to any instance of such an endless loop should make us wonder, however,
whether this is really a problem.
In this example, the appellate court is deciding two issues with respect to each piece of
evidence: whether the evidence may, and whether it must, be admitted. This binary nature of
the underlying issues leads to an unusual three-way choice of outcome on appeal. That is, the
appeals court as a whole is not deciding simply to affirm or reverse, but whether to affirm, or to
reverse with instructions to admit j but not k, or to reverse with instructions to admit k but not
j. Unlike in most appeals, this appeal has three possible outcomes. As I explained in my earlier
piece, when an appellate court must choose among three or more outcomes, none of which has a
majority of the court, the higher rule that the court must decide the case requires some judges
to vote against their own position. Rogers, 79 Ky. L. J. at 459-61 (cited in note 3). This has
been the practice for that precise reason. See text accompanying notes 117-18. It makes no
sense to apply the practice mandated by unusual three-possible-outcome appeals to typical two-
possible-outcome appeals.
53. Professors Kornhauser and Sager assume to the contrary that if the Tidewater court
had engaged in issue voting, "the Court would have offered lower courts and its own successors
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in Tidewater the justices somehow agreed as a preliminary matter to
engage in issue voting, despite the possibility that a decision would
issue inconsistent with the independent legal analysis of a majority of
the justices. They next would have to identify the major subissues.
There could be disagreement on the question of what the major subis-
sues are. Justices might try to determine neutral principles for mak-
ing that determination, but differ as to what the relevant factors
might be. Or they might disagree as to the application of the relevant
factors. There would then be the necessity of establishing a voting
protocol for determining what the subissues are. Should issue voting
or outcome voting apply to voting on what the subissues are? Once
the subissues are established, should each subissue be voted on as a
whole, or should there be votes on sub-subissues? There might be
disagreement on that issue. Once again justices may try to determine
neutral principles for making this determination, yet differ as to what
the relevant factors might be. Or they might disagree on the applica-
tion of those agreed-upon factors for determining whether there
should be votes on sub-subissues. Once again a voting protocol would
have to be established, and the judges would have to determine
whether to use issue voting or outcome voting when voting on
whether to have issue or outcome voting on subissues. While the
justices might not address all of these issues expressly, there is no
doubt that they would have to be resolved before judgment could be
reached.
Now, "following high court precedent" can be thought of as a
shorthand way of saying "predicting what the higher court would
do."5 4 If the Supreme Court engages in outcome voting, as it now does
almost universally, then a lower court has to engage in counting the
the stable extension of well-settled principles." Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 27
(cited in note 7).
54. For citations of statements to this effect by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Karl
Llewellyn, Richard Posner, and others, see Caminker, 73 Tex. L. Rev. at 29 n.110 (cited in note
41). Caminker contrasts the prediction model with a "precedene' model (which I read to be one
in which higher court opinions are akin to legislation). Caminker elaborately defends the
prediction model, but curiously would not carry it to the logical (and eminently supportable)
conclusion that lower courts should predict high court overruling of high court precedent. Id. at
70-72. Compare John Rogers, Lower Court Application of the "Overruling Law" of Higher
Courts, 1 Legal Theory 179, 179-91 (1995). Professor Caminker, it should be noted, finds the
prediction model to be especially appropriate where cases like Tidewater are concerned.
Caminker, 73 Tex. L. Rev. at 67-69 (cited in note 41). For criticism of the prediction model, see
Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 651 (1995). As Caminker
notes, even under the precedent model of adjudication, cases like Tidewater can be applied as
precedent. Caminker, 73 Tex. L. Rev. at 64 n.221 (cited in note 41). And if somehow Professor
Doffs position is inconsistent with the existence of incoherent holdings, then every such holding
is a rejection of Doffs position!
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votes of individual justices in order to apply the precedent to a new
factual situation. But if the Supreme Court engages in issue voting,
the lower court now has the following very difficult problem: in all
cases that have more than one controversial legal issue, the lower
court must somehow figure out how the Supreme Court would resolve
all of the issue division and voting issues described in the previous
paragraph. The court will either be unguided or have an inscrutably
difficult multilevel task of anticipation to undertake. So if you want
to talk about really worthless precedents, issue voting will certainly
create them.55
B. Encouraging Lawyers to Make Insubstantial Arguments
Professors Post and Salop argue that outcome voting encour-
ages lawyers to raise "[a]ny issue... if even a single Justice might
find it a plausible ground on which to base his or her judgment."56
The result is an asserted "incentive to engage in 'kitchen sink'
advocacy."57 The reader who has engaged in much advocacy before
appellate panels may well ask how often the advocate actually
reasons, "No majority will buy this, but I may pick up a vote, so I will
include this issue." The negative effect of presenting an argument
that is so weak that it is obviously unacceptable to the majority will
usually outweigh the slim possibility that one will pick up a needed
vote from a quirky judge. 58 (This is not to say that insubstantial
arguments are not made, but only that, when made, the advocate
generally has at least some hope that a majority will buy the
argument.) I do not have empirical evidence for this assumption, but
then Professors Post and Salop present none for their opposite
assumption.
What is very likely, however, is that a system of issue voting
will lead lawyers to make strained and very abstract arguments.
What able lawyer cannot take a relatively clear-cut issue, divide it up
into subissues, and then demand resolution of each subissue in an
55. This argument is related to my criticism of Justice White's vote in Union Gas as ren-
dering uncertain the precedential effect of the decision. See Rogers, 79 Ky. L. J. at 471-72 (cited
in note 3). Recently, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the uncertainty of the
precedential effect of Union Gas because of Justice White's vote. See Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1127-28 (1996).
56. Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 760 (cited in note 6).
57. Id. at 760.
58. This is particularly so in cases before federal courts of appeals where an advocate does
not learn the composition of the panel until after briefing.
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effort to corner a judge into the decision the lawyer wants? Lawyers
on the other side will demand that the issues be divided differently in
order to drive the court in different directions. Lawyers on either side
can then argue over what factors should govern the division of the
issues.59 While some such issues are argued on appeal even under
outcome voting, lawyers would pay much more attention to making
such arguments if the judges are required to vote on such issues as
part of the judgment process. Under issue voting, the potential to
engage in pettifoggery seems enormous.
C. Legal Incoherence
A much stronger argument against outcome voting is the pos-
sibility of incoherent results. Although incoherence sounds bad, it is
not as bad as inconsistency, as I tried to explain once before. 60 In each
case like Tidewater, it is possible to hypothesize three cases: one case
in which two issues (whether-X and whether-Y) are raised as in
Tidewater itself, and two subsequent cases in each of which only one
of the issues is presented (whether-X in one, whether-Y in the other).
In the first case the holding will be "we can't say both X and Y." In
the second case the holding will be "we say X," and in the third case
the holding will be "we say Y." A reasonable individual reasoner
would not come to all three conclusions.
Let us look at an example. The example I gave of such a set of
three cases was based on Wyman-Gordon.61 The example given by
Professors Post and Salop involved a different administrative law
hypothetical of their own making.62 An example could be constructed
using Tidewater, but I will use a simpler example. Three criminals
commit identical crimes. The police use a questionable search tech-
nique to get evidence against Q, and the trial court allows a question-
able peremptory challenge. In the trial of defendant R, only the ques-
tionable search technique is involved, while in the trial of S, only the
questionable peremptory challenge is involved. Otherwise the cases
are legally identical. Assume six justices (AB,C,D,E,F) think the
search technique is constitutional, while three justices (G,H,I) do not.
Assume however that AB,C and G,H,I (six justices) think the
peremptory challenge is constitutional, but D,E,F (three justices) do
59. All of this follows resolution of the issue on which Professors Kornhauser and Sager
advocate a metavote, whether there should be issue or outcome voting in the first place.
60. See Rogers, 79 Ky. L. J. at 465-74 (cited in note 3).
61. Id. at 465-66.
62. See Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 745-46, 766 (cited in note 6).
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not. In cases of first impression, the convictions of R and S would
stand, while that of Q would be reversed. This is incoherent because
no justice took the following position, which would be the law: a
conviction involving both the questionable search technique and the
questionable peremptory challenge is invalid, but an otherwise proper
conviction involving only one but not the other is valid. Since there is
no logical relation between the search technique and the peremptory
challenge, this seems an irrational rule.
Although not rational in the sense that an individual reasoner
could logically reach the rule, the rule can certainly be applied consis-
tently.63 The lower court on remand in the case of Q need only avoid
one or the other problem. Subsequent lower courts can easily apply
the rule, and there is no basis for Professors Post and Salop's state-
ment that "eventually the two lines of precedent must collide."64 It
may be that one group of justices will ultimately change its mind, but
there is no more reason for it to do so than with any other position
taken by a justice that determines a case.
Of course it may be embarrassing to the law that we have a
rule that no individual reasoner could arrive at. We could eliminate
the problem quickly and easily by mandating that all appellate courts
consist of one judge only. We do not do so because the system finds
better judgment-accuracy, consistency, fairness, political responsibil-
ity-in multiple member appellate courts.65 The occasional anomaly
63. Professors Post and Salop thus are incorrect when they suggest that the example in-
volves inconsistency, that this is a situation of two precedents where "one holds that the law is
A and the other holds that the law is not-Ak" Id. at 765. Post and Salop subsequently appear to
recognize that the problem is instead one of coherence. See id. at 766-67 (describing the risks of
incoherence). Professors Kornhauser and Sager also occasionally refer to the problem as one of
inconsistency. See Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 27 (cited in note 7). This is
particularly confusing coming from the two authors who themselves most clearly drew the
distinction between inconsistency and incoherence. See Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G.
Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 Yale L. J. 82, 102-09 (1986) ("explor[ing consistency and
coherence in the context of multi-member courts"). Writing separately, Professor Kornhauser
has also recognized that "[ijn result-bound adjudication, like cases will be treated alike, though
which way they are treated may depend on the order in which they are decided." Lewis A.
Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts. II. Legal Doctrine, 8 J. Law, Econ. & Organization 441,
445 (1992).
64. Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 766 (cited in note 6).
65. See Kornhauser and Sager, 96 Yale L. J. at 97-100 (cited in note 63); Kornhauser and
Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 6 n.10 (cited in note 7); id. at 6 n.10; Caminker, 73 Tex. L. Rev. at 42 &
n.155 (cited in note 41). See also William G. Fuqua, From Judge to Justice, 6 Ky. Bar News, No.
4, p. 2 (1995) (reporting observations of a trial court judge elevated to the Kentucky Supreme
Court that "there was a great deal of comfort in knowing that any decision that was made
carried with it the concurrence of at least three other jurists. This was a luxury that I had not
enjoyed as a trial judge").
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is not so harmful as to warrant the drastic solution of reducing all
appellate courts to one member. The same could be said regarding
issue voting. The occasional anomaly is not so harmful as to warrant
the drastic solution of issue voting.
Issue voting is a bad solution because it would be so much
more indeterminate than the outcome-voting system. Results will not
depend on counting logical independent votes but on anticipating how
issues will be divided, and then on counting votes on the various is-
sues. There is no developed body of law on how issues must be
divided for separate voting. In order to approach consistency in the
law, there would have to be a whole body of law developed on the
question of dividing issues on appeal. One can foresee whole law
courses on "Division of Issues." The artificiality of the endeavor
would become an embarrassment to the law, even apart from the
difficulty of explaining to the public that the court has reached a
result that a majority of justices oppose.
D. Path Dependence
The problem of incoherence is closely related to the problem of
path dependence. The concern is that outcome voting permits the
sequence of appellate cases to determine the outcome. 66 Such path
dependence is assumed to be bad.
To see just how bad this situation is, let us take a worst-case
example: the criminal procedure example above. If the cases are
decided in the sequence Q,R,S (or Q,S,R), then the law will be that a
combination of the questionable search and the questionable peremp-
tory challenge will be unconstitutional, but that neither the question-
able search nor the questionable challenge without the other will
invalidate a conviction. But, if the cases are decided in any sequence
where Q is not the first of the three cases, then the result in Q will be
different. This is because one of the issues, having been applied to
determine a previous case by a majority vote, will be binding as a
matter of stare decisis. For instance, if R's case came up first, six
justices (AB,C,D,E,F) would uphold the conviction on the ground that
the search was constitutional. When Q's case later came up, all nine
justices would be bound by stare decisis to hold the search constitu-
tional, and six justices would find the peremptory challenge constitu-
tional (AB,C,G,H,I), so the high court would affirm the conviction. In
contrast, if the Q case arose first, the rule that combined error re-
66. See Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 762-64 (cited in note 6).
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quires reversal would apply in Q and subsequent combined-error
cases.
The R and S cases will be decided the same under any se-
quence, but the Q case will have different results depending upon
whether it reaches the appellate court before or after either the R or S
case. Thus the result in Q is path dependent. Three points will show
that this epithet should not concern us. First, the evil of path depend-
ence is no greater than the evil of stare decisis, without which
outcome voting would not be path dependent in the first place.
Second, the path dependence problem is inherently limited because
the sequence is not randomly determined. Third, there are in any
event much less drastic ways of dealing with the problem.
The path dependence problem is directly caused by the way in
which judges on one court apply the doctrine of stare decisis to prece-
dents of the same court.67 Stare decisis requires judges to apply the
law as formerly applied by the same court, even if the judge would
come to a different conclusion in the absence of that precedent. The
doctrine only makes a difference if the judge, apart from the prece-
dent, would have voted differently. So even if the judge believes that
the issue was wrongly decided before, the judge must now continue to
apply the "wrongly decided" law.68
The path dependence problem identified by Professors Post,
Salop, Kornhauser, and Sager assumes that appellate judges will be
bound by, and apply, holdings that they voted against. 69 Of course
there are times when judges find an exception to stare decisis and
vote to overrule. In addition, there are some issues over which a
judge feels so strongly that he or she will continue to vote
independently no matter how often or how clearly the law is rejected
by majority holdings. But in either of those situations, under a
regime of outcome voting, the path dependence problem does not
arise. In our criminal procedure example, should D,E,F and G,H,I
stick to their guns even after being outvoted in the R and S cases, the
later case of Q will be decided just as if it had arisen before R or S.
67. This is sometimes called "horizontal stare decisis." "Vertical stare decisis," in contrast,
refers to the obligation of courts to follow precedents of higher courts. See, for example, C.
Steven Bradford, Following Dead Precedent- The Supreme Court's Rejection of Anticipatory
Overruling, 59 Fordham L. Rev. 39, 68-69 (1990).
68. See Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1989);
Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 588 (1987); Theodore M. Benditt, The Rule
of Precedent, in Laurence Goldstein, ed., Precedent in Law 91 (Clarendon, 1987).
69. See Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 6 n.11 (cited in note 7).
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That is, the incoherent result that both errors combined results in
reversal, even though it had previously been held that neither of the
errors alone would invalidate the conviction, would apply regardless
of the sequence of the three cases. So in order to consider the path
dependence problem, we must assume that appellate judges will vote
for holdings that they previously voted against (or would have voted
against).
Note that regardless of the sequence of the Q, R, and S cases,
the R and S cases will be decided the same way. That is, regardless of
the order in which the cases arise, under outcome voting there is no
path dependence with regard to the single issue cases. In both the R
and S cases in our example, the conviction will be upheld whether or
not the combined-error Q case has already been decided by the court.70
Only the Q case result will depend upon whether R or S has already
reached the court. 71
70. Professors Post and Salop unpersuasively suggest that this might not be so. They sug-
gest that when a combined-issue and one single-issue case have already been decided, the
second single-issue case may be decided in a way different than if it had arisen first:
To reach this result, the court would reason that the precedents established in the two
previous cases necessarily determine the outcome in the third case. That is, in order to
harmonize the three cases, the lower court must hold "Yes" in the third case [that is, the
position of a minority on the Supreme Court on the single issue] in order to satisfy the
two precedents. The lower court will be in conflict with the votes of the Supreme Court
on this issue in the [two-issue case] but it will be consistent with the outcomes of the two
cases reviewed by the Court. If the Supreme Court affirms this outcome, then preceden-
tial inconsistency will be avoided.
Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 767 (cited in note 6). It does not make sense for lower
courts to reason this way, and Professors Post and Salop later give a clear example of one that
did not. Id. at 769-70 n.96 (citing Marathon Pipeline Co. v. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 12
B.R. 946 (D. Minn. 1981), affirmed 458 U.S. 50 (1981)). If a lower court actually ruled against
the Supreme Court's majority position in the single-issue case and the Supreme Court were to
affirm, a confused body of law would indeed result. But there is no reason for the Supreme
Court to affirm. There is no majority holding that requires it to do so under stare decisis.
Certainly the earlier combined-issue case would not require the result, since by definition the
result in that case depended on the presence of both issues in the same case.
Professors Kornhauser and Sager make a suggestion similar to Post and Salop's. One
alternative in a single-issue case following Tidewater (that is, one raising only the Article I
issue) would be to "affirm Tidewater and reverse the previous majority" on the Article I issue.
Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 26 (cited in note 7). The Court could only do this by
rejecting the application of stare decisis in the single-issue case.
71. Professor Stearns makes an argument that might suggest that path dependence will
control the outcomes of the R and S cases as well. He posits a case in which Justices
A,B,C,D,E,F would hold that Washington State statute X violates the 14th Amendment (while
G,H,I hold that X comports with the 14th Amendment), and Justices A,B,C,G,H,I would hold
that California statute Y comports with the 14th Amendment (while D,E,F would hold that Y
violates the 14th Amendment). Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest:
Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 1309, 1353-55 (1995). See also Maxwell L.
Stearns, Standing and Social Choica" Historic Evidence, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 309, 323-27 (1995).
Professor Stearns deduces from this that Justices D,E,F,G,H,I form a majority for the
proposition that the Washington and California statutes should be decided "in the same man-
ner." Stearns, 83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1355. See also Stearns, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 324. This is true
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If we assume that there is one "right" and one "wrong" decision
in the Q case, then if the Q,R,S cases come up in one sequence, the
court system provides the right answer; and if the Q,R,S cases come
up in another sequence, the court system provides the wrong
answer.72 But that is true in general if the doctrine of stare decisis is
applied. In other words, the evil of path dependence that results from
outcome voting is the very "evil" of stare decisis itself-we are stuck
with an earlier decision that may be wrong. The path dependence
criticism of outcome voting thus boils down to a criticism of the
horizontal principle of stare decisis. While stare decisis is amenable
to criticism, there are strong arguments to support it. 73 The system
will sometimes end up with the wrong law, but considerations of
consistency and other values justify the possibility. The same can be
said for the path dependence criticism of outcome voting. The system
will sometimes end up with the wrong resolution of the law (that is,
the rule in the combined-issue case when the sequence of cases
happens to be one way rather than the other), but considerations of
consistency and other values justify the possibility. Other than that,
what is the harm?
Critics may be uncomfortable with this answer to the path
dependence argument because the incoherent result (when the com-
bined-issue case arises first) appears so clearly wrong to them.74 If we
assume in contrast that the incoherent result might be the right one,
then we merely have the systemic chance that we may possibly be
only in the sense that D,E,F would hold that both X and Y violate the 14th Amendment, and
G,H,I would hold that both X and Y comport with the 14th Amendment. But this is simply not
to say-as Stearns does-that if the Washington (X) case came first then Justices G,H,I, who
would have dissented in the Washington case, would feel bound in the California (Y) case.
Stearns, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1355. In the example, G,H,I thought that X and Y should both be
upheld; it does not follow that if X is struck down, Justices G,H,I would be unable to distinguish
the case that they disagreed with. In other words, preferring that two cases be decided one way
is hardly the same thing as saying they are indistinguishable when one of them has been
decided the opposite way.
72. By "right" I mean whatever answer the court would arrive at if properly applying the
correct law, entirely without regard to the reader's view as to what the proper criteria are. No
matter what a judge's position is on positivism, natural law, realism, formalism, interpretevism,
originalism, etc., the very idea of law contemplates at least that some precepts are law and some
are not. Although we often do not agree what is the law and what is not, we generally agree
that a particular precept must either be the law or not be the law. See John M. Rogers and
Robert Molzon, Some Lessons about the Law from Self-Referential Problems in Mathematics, 90
Mich. L. Rev. 992, 999-1002 (1992).
73. Rogers, 79 Ky. L. J. at 463-65 (cited in note 3).
74. See, for example, Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 58 (cited in note 7) (stating
that outcome voting where issues are independent "produces outcomes that are patently
arbitrary and hence wrong").
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stuck with a wrong decision-the same risk that stare decisis pre-
sents. The path dependence argument thus comes down to whether
an incoherent result is inherently wrong as a matter of public policy.
I have dealt with that issue in the previous Section and elsewhere7 5
The problem of path dependence is not only no worse than the
downside of the stare decisis doctrine from which it results, but the
problem is inherently limited because the path is not arbitrary or
random. This can be demonstrated by observing that pairs of issues,
each of which draws a different majority in one case, have varying
degrees of likelihood of arising in the same case. We can call this
characteristic of two issues their "co-occurrence likelihood."76 The
following issues, for example, would have a high co-occurrence likeli-
hood: (a) whether a certain state employment practice violates 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and (b) whether the same practice violates Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act; or (a) whether an agency regulation exceeds the
agency's regulatory power, and (b) whether the same regulation vio-
lates the United States Constitution.
Of course if issues are related in the sense that resolution of
one affects the resolution of the other, it is particularly likely that the
issues will arise in the same case. But co-occurrence could also be
likely where the issues are entirely independent. In the second exam-
ple above, for instance, the statutory challenge to the regulation may
be based purely on the meaning of a jurisdictional word in the statute,
while the constitutional challenge could be based on a conceptually
unrelated provision in the Bill of Rights, such as the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment.
If the co-occurrence likelihood of two issues is high, then the
problem of path dependence for those two issues is small because the
sequence of cases in which both issues are raised (like Q), and cases
in which only one issue is raised (like R or S), will not be random.
Instead, because the presence of one issue makes the presence of the
other issue likely, the combined-issue case (like Q) will most likely
arise before any case in which only one issue arises. Thus, for pairs of
issues where the co-occurrence likelihood is high, the law will natu-
rally tend to the path where the judges' votes on the combination of
issues will form the law.
In contrast, if the co-occurrence likelihood of two issues is low,
the single-issue case (like R or S) will most likely occur first, and only
coincidentally will the combined-issue case occur first. Thus, for pairs
75. Rogers, 79 Ky. L. J. at 465-74 (cited in note 3).
76. Now that I'm getting into it, I guess making up jargon can be sort of fun.
1018 [Vol. 49:997
1996 RESPONSE TO ISSUE VOTING 1019
of issues where the co-occurrence likelihood is low, the law will natu-
rally tend to the path where the judges' votes on the individual issues
will form the law.
Some examples illustrate this phenomenon clearly. In their
effort to show the arbitrariness of the path dependence incurred by
outcome voting, Professors Post and Salop use a three-case exam-
ple-a combined-issue case plus two single-issue cases-based on
Tidewater.7 Professors Kornhauser and Sager use a similar exam-
ple.78 The result is path dependent in Tidewater, the argument runs,
because the result depends upon whether the Supreme Court
considers Tidewater before or after a case in which only one of the two
issues of Tidewater is presented.79  But the Post and Salop
hypothetical single-issue cases (that is, in which only one of the issues
is presented) sound artificial 8° because it is very difficult to
77. Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 764 (cited in note 6). Post and Salop also use
an administrative law hypothetical. Id. at 763-64.
78. Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 26-27 (cited in note 7). They also use an
example based on Union Gas to make the same point, hypothesizing a case previous to Union
Gas in which Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens had been able to
decide that the Constitution permits Congress to create a cause of action against a state when
legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause, but in which the question of whether the
language of CERCLA permits a suit against a state in federal court was not raised. Id. at 14,
39.
Professors Kornhauser and Sager also use a pollution example where different majorities
find (a) strict liability and (b) a particular waiver is unenforceable, but the two minorities
constitute an overall majority that rejects either a or b, so that under outcome voting there is no
liability. Id. at 36-38. In such a situation, "case-by-case voting has the consequence of giving a
dissenting vote on a constituent question decisive force in the outcome of the case since the
identity of one or more judges who hold dissenting views are crucial to that outcome." Id. at 38.
To the extent that their words "dissenting vote" mean a vote against the outcome of the appeal,
then Kornhauser and Sager misuse the term. If the words mean instead disagreement with a
majority on an underlying issue, then the observation is a mere restatement of the voting
problem we are debating rather than an explanation of how outcome voting leads to path
dependence.
79. Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 764 (cited in note 6); Kornhauser and Sager, 81
Cal. L. Rev. at 27 (cited in note 7). The assumption of course is that the Article I versus Article
III basis for the statute is the proper way to divide the issues. Compare text accompanying
notes 33-37.
80. Professors Post and Salop ask us to "assume that, prior to the passage of the statute at
issue in Tidewater, a resident of the District of Columbia brought a diversity suit in federal
court, claiming that jurisdiction was proper because the District is a state for diversity
purposes." Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 764 (cited in note 6). Allowing such a suit
would have required an overruling of the statutory holding of Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 445, 453 (1805), that the general diversity statute did not include D.C. citizens.
This was not at issue in Tidewater and accordingly no justice urged a change in the statutory
holding. Some justices advocated overruling the alleged constitutional holding of Hepburn that
D.C. is not a "State" under Article III-a different issue. Indeed, if the issues were the same,
then Hepburn itself would be the hypothesized single-issue case that occurred before Tidewater.
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hypothesize a real case in which only one of the issues is presented.
In order to present the Article III issue, the case would have to
involve a statute granting diversity jurisdiction to federal courts over
disputes between citizens of a state and citizens of an entity that may
or may not be included within the Article III meaning of "State." It is
hard to think of such an entity other than the District of Columbia or
a territory of the United States. In either of those situations, though,
the Article I issue is also presented: Congress has the power to
legislate for both D.C. and for territories. Only a strained and
artificial hypothetical could present one issue without the other. One
would have to come up with a case where, for instance, Congress
extends diversity jurisdiction to citizens of a non-state entity over
which Congress has no legislative power. For the Tidewater pair of
issues, then, the overwhelming likelihood is that the combined issue
case will arise first. The path dependence problem is thus alleviated,
if not totally eliminated, by the fact that the nature of the issues
determines the order in which the three hypothetical cases arise.
Similarly, in trying to explain how cases like Tidewater are
incoherent, I used three hypothetical cases based on Wyman-Gordon.81
In that case the two issues were: (1) whether the NLRB violated the
A.P.A. by not engaging in rule making on a particular issue, and (2) if
the NLRB violated the A.P.A. by not engaging in rule making,
whether reversal of the NLRB was required. Different majorities
answered each question yes, but no majority accepted both 1 and 2.
The result was affirmance of the NLRB. I hypothesized two later
cases, one in which only issue 1 was presented, and one in which only
issue 2 was presented. But I did so abstractly because it is very hard
to think of a real case in which only one of these issues is presented.
Of course it is not impossible; one of the issues, for instance, could be
conceded by the parties. But if the issues are likely to co-occur, the
sequence of the three possible cases will likely see the combined-issue
case arising first.
In contrast, the best example of a pair of issues where the
single-issue case may plausibly come before the combined-issue case
is one like my Q,R,S example above where the two issues have very
"For expositional purposes," Professors Kornhauser and Sager ask us to "assume that the
Court considers an extension of jurisdiction to a district court in the Territory of Guam and that
there is no plausible argument that the Territory of Guam is a state within the meaning of
Article Ill." Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 26 (cited in note 7). But in the actual
post-Tidewater cases involving territories, there was not only a plausible argument to that
effect, but the argument was made to find that Justice Rutledge would hold the statute
constitutional on that ground. See text accompanying note 42.
81. See Rogers, 79 Ky. L. J. at 465-66 (cited in note 3).
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little in common. The only characteristic of the search issue that
makes it likely to arise in the peremptory challenge case is the fact
that it arises in a criminal case. It is only happenstance that the
issues are presented in the same case. Most pairs of issues with this
low likelihood of co-occurrence will see one of the single-issue cases
arise first. Of course it is possible that totally unrelated issues will
occur in the same case before either one is presented separately, but
the system will naturally tend toward the other sequence.
Thus the system is naturally stable. While the resolution of
the combined-issue case is path dependent, the path is not random
and arbitrary. Rather, the path is largely determined by the relative
likelihood that the two issues will occur in the same case. The more
closely the issues are related, the more likely they will co-occur, and
the more likely there will be a special rule for when they co-occur.
The less closely the issues are related, the less likely they will co-
occur, and the less likely there will be a special rule of law for when
they do co-occur. This is not an embarrassment to the law. Instead,
it is merely a necessary concomitance of consistent decision making
by multimember appellate courts. The alternative is either a system
of single-judge courts, with the loss of wisdom that this entails, or a
system of issue voting, with its potential for radical indeterminacy.
There is, finally, a far less drastic way to lessen the path de-
pendence that does exist, at least for courts with discretionary review
power. If the Supreme Court, for instance, would refrain from grant-
ing certiorari in the same case on totally unrelated issues, then truly
anomalous situations like the criminal procedure example
above-where the co-occurrence of issues is pure happen-
stance-would be avoided. One might ask if the problem is big
enough to warrant even this suggestion. At the least, those who are
concerned with the problem should be satisfied with advocating such
an easy cure rather than a radical and destabilizing change in how
judges vote.
IV. THE INSTABILITY OF ISSUE VOTING
The basic criticisms of outcome voting therefore do not with-
stand analysis, at least when contrasted with any alternative. In my
critique of the votes of Justices White and Kennedy in Union Gas and
Fulminante, respectively, I argued that there was no reasoned basis
for voting against one's position in some cases (because outvoted on a
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subissue) but not in other cases. There lay the indeterminacy.82
Professors Post and Salop try to avoid this problem by advocating
issue voting in all cases. There are several unanswered problems
with this solution. First there is the practical problem of getting all
members of the Court to accept the new voting protocol. Perhaps a
constitutional amendment would be necessary to get everyone on
board. While advocates of issue voting may say their idea is good,
even if not accepted, there would be enormous indeterminacy in
partial acceptance.
Second, for Professors Post and Salop to advocate issue voting
in all cases, they must accept some results that will deeply embarrass
the judicial system. If, for instance, there are three constitutional
challenges to a criminal defendant's capital conviction and different
groups of only three justices agree with each challenge, the criminal
could be executed although all justices independently find the convic-
tion unconstitutional. Post and Salop basically say, why not? 3 One
answer is that the polity that ultimately must accept judicial
decisions will have a hard time accepting such a result. The only way
to defend headlines like "JONES EXECUTED; ALL JUSTICES
AGREE CONVICTION UNCONSTITUTIONAL" would be to explain
that the justices voted issue-by-issue on what the law is, and the
application of this law requires execution. But who made the
decision? Who did the applying?84 Each justice can say that if the
court had agreed with him or her, the defendant would not have been
executed. But this is not how the public thinks judges should act.
Judges should not be voting on the law like legislators but should be
applying the law and bearing responsibility for the proper application
of the law. It would fundamentally undermine the responsibility of
the judiciary to permit, or require, judges to vote for results that they
oppose.8 5
82. Professors Post and Salop recognize a related problem: the "absence of a firm voting
rule raises the uncomfortable possibility of strategic voting by the Justices." Post and Salop, 80
Georgetown L. J. at 745 (cited in note 6). See also id. at 755-57. The seriousness of the strategic
voting problem is demonstrated by Professors Kornhauser and Sager, though it obviously does
not lead them to reject issue voting. See Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 51-56 (cited
in note 7).
83. Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 760 (cited in note 6) ("[W]hy indeed should the
defendant be spared?").
84. Professors Post and Salop assert, "Under true issue-voting, the Justices would not be
compelled to vote on the outcome of the cases at all, since the judgment of the court would be
automatically determined by the Justices' views on each of the issues." Id. at 752. Professors
Kornhauser and Sager characterize the outcome under issue voting as "a matter of simple
doctrinal arithmetic." Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 16 (cited in note 7).
85. Professors Kornhauser and Sager suggest that a decision like the one described is
troubling because the result is criminal conviction, and they propose that a special rule require
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Third, the proposal that judges always engage in issue voting
only addresses the indeterminacy involved in deciding whether to
engage in issue voting as opposed to outcome voting. There is also the
indeterminacy inherent in figuring out how issues should be divided.
As explained above, 6 there is often more than one answer to the ques-
tion, and the difference in the answers will be outcome determinative.
Professors Kornhauser and Sager, on the other hand, seek to
avoid the possibility of obviously indefensible results by proposing
that issue voting sometimes be used and sometimes not.8 7 They pro-
pose a "metavote" by the Court on whether to engage in issue voting
or outcome voting.88 Their answer to the indeterminacy critique is to
provide a list of factors for determining on a case-by-case basis
whether or not all the members of the Court should engage in issue
voting.89 Once again there are several unanswered problems with this
solution.
issue voting when outcome voting would lead to upholding conviction for a serious crime. Id. at
40-41 & nn.66-67. As Professors Post and Salop easily demonstrate, outcome voting could lead
to conviction and issue voting could lead to acquittal in a case where the theories for upholding
convictions are inconsistent. Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 761 (cited in note 6). I
would argue that the public would be similarly outraged by the headline, "CONVICT SET
FREE, ALL JUSTICES AGREE CONVICTION PROPER." There is, after all, a public interest
in convicting criminals. In this regard, it has been observed that the California voters ousted
California Chief Justice Rose Bird for following a hidden agenda inconsistent with the law in a
way that was advantageous to criminal defendants:
Her opposition to the death penalty was not in doubt, but unlike Justices Brennan and
Marshall, she did not preface her every vote with a candid statement of that position.
Rather, she managed in every death case that came before her to find some more
particular defect... Mhe result was unconvincing, and in the end I suspect far more
provocative than frank and consistent opposition.
Charles Fried, Impudence, 1992 S. Ct. Rev. 155, 167.
86. See text accompanying notes 36-37.
87. They also want to avoid situations where issue voting might lead to a result that is
substantively not "appealing." Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 29 (cited in note 7). It
would be "intolerable," for instance, "that the inability of the Justices to agree on the detail of
doctrine should be allowed to suppress the Court's exploration of gender justice" Id. Compare
the apparent rationale of Justice Kennedy in Fulminante that issue voting may be warranted in
the special case where outcome voting would lead to capital punishment. 499 U.S. 279, 313
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
It would be particularly anomalous to have voting protocol determinations based on the
merits of the case. Professors Kornhauser and Sager assert that the choice of voting protocol
should not be determined by a judge's views on the merits, Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L.
Rev. at 31 (cited in note 7), but later hedge this position by saying that a judge's vote on voting
protocol might "legitimately be inflected" by views on the merits, id. at 32.
88. Id. at 30. Such a vote would presumably be required whenever there is no majority
opinion, regardless of when during deliberation it becomes apparent that there will be no such
opinion. Id. at 31-32.
89. Id. at 33-48.
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First, we still have the practical problem of putting the system
in place. How can some justices, even on a case-by-case basis, force
others to defer to their voting on issues? Is a constitutional amend-
ment required? Once again, if some justices reject the new system, no
amount of consistency in the application of the Kornhauser and Sager
factors by those who accept them will render the results consistent.
Second, the factors proposed by Kornhauser and Sager to de-
cide whether to use issue voting at best mitigate the total lack of
guiding principles found in the votes of Justices White and Kennedy
in Union Gas and Fulminante. Though camouflaged somewhat, some
of the factors are closely related to views of justices on the merits of
the particular case. 90  The other factors consist of case-specific
weighing of the various purported bad effects of outcome voting that I
have dealt with above.91 Assuming that these factors were somehow
legally accepted or imposed, there is still a lot of room for
interpretation and manipulation in their application. Judges may
legitimately disagree on how to apply them in particular cases,
especially when such votes are still a novelty.92 The metaquestion will
90. Professors Kornhauser and Sager's first factor is the "durability" of commitment of the
justices to the relevant subissues of law. Id. at 33-36. The judge should consider whether she is
more committed in the long run to doctrinal specifics than to the overall development of consti-
tutional doctrine. Id. Presumably a judge should vote for issue voting if she is strongly commit-
ted to one side of a subissue, but for outcome voting if she is not so strongly committed on the
subissues. But what of the levels of commitment on the part of other justices? Must justices
now argue their positions in conference and in interchamber memos not only on the law, but
also on how strongly they believe it is the law?
Professors Kornhauser and Sager's third factor is even more closely related to the merits.
They suggest that where serious criminal convictions are involved, since they "alter the status
quo in such a drastic way," the government must win on both issue-voting and outcome-voting
protocols in order for the conviction to be upheld. Id. at 39-41. Such a "tilt' in the criminal
justice system against conviction is wholly unwarranted and is expressly based on the authors'
weighing of criminal law considerations. Others might argue that the crime problem in the
United States requires convictions to be upheld more rather than less than they now are. The
problem is one of judicial responsibility. My example of a criminal executed when eight out of
nine justices find the defendant unconstitutionally convicted is no more shocking than the
reverse possibility of issue voting, where a criminal is set free when eight out of nine justices
find the defendant to be legally convicted, unless one assumes that nonconviction is better as a
matter of public policy than conviction. Victims might not think so. Of course public policy
requires the state to be extra sure that the defendant is guilty, and the elements of criminal law
and procedure, such as the jury requirement, the presumption of innocence, etc., should be
designed to do that. But these mechanisms are appropriately designed to preserve society's
interest in enforcing the criminal laws. It makes no sense to put a thumb on the balance in
deciding how a high appellate court will vote. See also note 85.
91. Professors Kornhauser and Sager suggest consideration of the relative seriousness of
the ill-effects of outcome voting in a particular case, especially path dependence and inadequate
guidance to lower courts. Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 36-39, 42-48 (cited in note
7). I have already explained why these are not substantial ill-effects in the first place.
92. Professors Kornhauser and Sager say the justices should conduct the metavote "as
they would any other question." Id. at 30.
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soon arise: How should the metavote be taken if there are different
majorities on determinative issues in the metavote? Should there be
issue voting or outcome voting on the metavote? Neither answer is
fully satisfactory. Outcome voting on the metavote could lead to the
very sort of path dependence that Kornhauser and Sager are trying to
address. But deciding whether to have issue voting might require a
meta-metavote. Nightmares of infinite regression are conceivable.
Let us assume, however, that the metavote is taken and that
Kornhauser and Sager's factors provide enough guidance so the deci-
sion whether to have issue voting or outcome voting in a particular
case is reasonably determinate. In those cases where issue voting is
the answer-Kornhauser and Sager give Tidewater as a paradigm
example93-we still have the indeterminacy inherent in deciding how
the issues will be divided. On this question, as under Professors Post
and Salop's proposal, we are given no guidance. All of the indetermi-
nacies of a universal issue-voting system come into play once the
determination is made to have issue voting in a particular case.94
In sum, although the laws are applied consistently, occasion-
ally judge-made laws will be incoherent due to the combination of the
following factors: (1) multimember appellate courts, (2) appellate
cases with multiple issues, and (3) outcome voting. The third factor
should not be tampered with any more than the first two. First, there
are strong reasons for not turning to singlo-member appellate courts.
Second, while it is impossible to reduce to one the number of disposi-
tive issues in a case when the issues are interrelated, courts with
discretionary review power could refrain from reviewing in one appeal
more than one of several issues co-occurring purely by happenstance.
Third, as demonstrated, there are overwhelming reasons for not turn-
ing to a system of issue voting.
V. A DEFENSE OF OUTCOME VOTING AGAINST THE CLAIM THAT IT
DOES NOT PRODUCE THE "CONDORCET WINNER"
While not in favor of any system of issue voting, Maxwell
Stearns has treated the incoherence problem in ways that suggest
outcome voting is bad. In a series of articles, Professor Stearns has
demonstrated that the problem of cycling is not as troubling a charac-
93. Id. at 27.
94. See text accompanying notes 36-37.
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teristic of our legal system as some might argue.9 5 Cycling refers to
the inability of a multimember decision maker to arrive at a decision
because of the members' differing orders of preferences. For instance,
if three legislators rank their outcome preferences A, B, and C as
follows-Person 1: A,B,C; Person 2: B,C,A; Person 3: C,A,B-then in
a pairwise vote between A and B the winner will be A, in a pairwise
vote between B and C the winner will be B, and in a pairwise vote
between C and A the winner will be C. In a series of pairwise votes
where the winner of each pairing is paired against the other
remaining possibility, the outcomes will cycle because the winner of
one pairing will never defeat the third choice in a subsequent
pairing.96 That is, the winner between A and B will lose to C, the
winner between A and C will lose to B, and the winner between B and
C will lose to A. The cycle will continue as long as the votes are pair-
wise if there is no outwardly imposed cutoff on the number of pairwise
votes, and certain other assumptions are made (such as the absence of
strategic voting against one's preference).
Professor Stearns has argued persuasively that the problem of
cycling in legislatures is alleviated by the interplay of Congress and
the courts.97 He has also argued that path dependence in court
decision making is alleviated by the application of properly
understood standing doctrine. 98 Unfortunately, in making his points
95. Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at 1219 (cited in note 27); 83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1309 (cited in note
71); 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 309 (cited in note 71).
96. See Stearns, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 314-15 (cited in note 71); Lewis A. Kornhauser,
Modeling Collegial Courts I: Path-Dependence, 12 Intl. Rev. L. & Econ. 169, 182 (1992)
(discussing cycling and leading a decision maker back to previously rejected alternatives).
97. Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at 1291 (cited in note 27). Professor Stearns does not make a
normative assessment of competing voting regimes for appellate courts, but rather he discusses
such regimes as a part of a larger inquiry into whether proposals to expand judicial review
based upon social choice are sound. In a positive analysis of the institutional structures and
decisional rules in both the Supreme Court and Congress, he employed as a benchmark the five
fairness conditions that Arrow's Theorem proved could not all be simultaneously met in one
rational institution. Since any collective decision making will come up short in some respect,
identification of a flaw in a given institution's voting rules cannot serve as a basis for
reassigning decisional authority unless the alternative decision or rule is superior. Stearns's
point is that notwithstanding some defects, the voting rules in the Supreme Court have evolved
to outcome voting. His argument is that outcome voting, even though it is a non-Condorcet-
producing rule, is superior to issue voting if we assume that the Supreme Court is
institutionally obligated to resolve cases before it. Stearns goes on to argue that given the
difficulty with appellate court decisional rules, proposals to expand judicial review are likely to
be unsound based on social choice theory. I have dealt with Arrow's Theorem before. See
Rogers, 79 Ky. L. J. at 467-70 (cited in note 3). My problem with Professor Stearns's argument
is not with his conclusion but rather with his ultimately undemonstrated characterization of
outcome voting as "non-Condorcet producing."
98. Stearns, 83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1309-10 (cited in note 71); Stearns, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at
459-62 (cited in note 71). I agree with Stearns's ultimate point in his pieces on standing:
"standing... limit[s] the extent to which litigants can benefit by opportunistically manipulating
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Stearns treats the incoherence problem addressed by Professors Post,
Salop, Kornhauser, and Sager as if it were a cycling problem.
Although perhaps related, the problems are different. In a statement
that he no longer embraces, 99 Stearns once called the result of issue
voting the Condorcet winner, thereby strongly suggesting that
outcome voting does not lead to the best result as a matter of public
policy.10°
A Condorcet winner is a choice that defeats all other available
choices in an unlimited series of pairwise elections using majority
rule.O1 For instance, in the above example, if the scheme of
preferences were-Person 1: A, B, C; Person 2: B, C, A; Person 3: C,
B, A (where Person 3's preferences have been changed)-then in a
series of pairwise votes, where the winner is put up against the
remaining possibility, the process will settle on B as the winner. In
this situation, B is the Condorcet winner.102
To apply this type of analysis to a Tidewater-type case,
Professor Stearns conflated legal reasons with legal results. He used
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways1°3 as his example of a Tidewater-
type case.10 4 I characterized Kassel as a case in which one of the two
issues was not reached by some of the justices.10 5 To avoid unneces-
the order in which issues are presented to federal circuit courts and, ultimately, to the Supreme
Court for consideration" Stearns, 83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1351 (cited in note 71).
99. See Stearns, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 321 n.49 (cited in note 71).
100. See note 106. See also Stearns, 83 Cal. L. Rev. at 42 (cited in note 71) (stating that
"case-by-case voting can lead to outcomes favored by only a minority of the Court"); Stearns, 144
U. Pa. L. Rev. at 325 (cited in note 71) (showing how a Court opinion would "inevitably thwart
the will of a majority of [its] members").
101. See Dennis G. Mueller, Public Choice II at 112-14 (Cambridge U., 1989). Sometimes
the pattern of preferences for multiple choices will lead to cycling rather than to a Condorcet
winner. This is the Condorcet paradox. See Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 12 n.22
(cited in note 7); Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 747 nn.16-17 (cited in note 6); Stearns,
83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1329-31 (cited in note 71).
102. See Stearns, 83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1332 (cited in note 71).
103. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
104. To make the identical point in his standing article, Stearns uses an elaborate standing
hypothetical. Stearns, 83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1336-38 (cited in note 71). The identical criticism
applies.
105. Rogers, 79 Ky. L. J. at 449 n.27 (cited in note 3). Kassel involved a dormant commerce
clause challenge to Iowa's truck-length limit. 450 U.S. at 664. In my earlier attempt to parse
all of the Supreme Court plurality opinion cases, I identified the relevant two subissues in
Kassel as (X) whether the Court should avoid second-guessing the balancing done by the state
legislature, and (Y) whether the Court should avoid looking at the state legislature's purpose in
determining the constitutionality of the state's regulation of commerce. All justices presumably
agreed that if both X and Y were the law, then the statute should be upheld (R). Justice Powell
and three others disagreed with X, Justice Brennan, writing for two justices, disagreed with Y,
so a majority of six struck the statute (not-R). 450 U.S. at 678-79, 687. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for three justices, agreed with both X and Y and therefore voted in dissent to uphold the
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sary complication, let us examine Stearns's analysis using the
Tidewater example we have already looked at here.
Professor Stearns referred to the dissent's result in Kassel or
Tidewater as the "Condorcet winner."106 The idea seemed to be that
when each judge is presented with only the yes-or-no choice of how
one issue is decided (pairwise choices), the conclusion is that of the
dissent. 107 For instance, in the Tidewater context, if all justices are
given only the pairwise choice that Article I does or does not authorize
the statute, a majority will prefer that Article I does not authorize the
statute. If all justices are given only the pairwise choice that Article
III does or does not authorize the statute, a majority will prefer that
Article III does not. So the Condorcet winner is that neither Article I
nor Article III authorizes the statute, since that is the preference of a
majority of decision makers when the choices are given pairwise.10 8
statute (R). 450 U.S. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Because Justice Brennan purported not
to reach X, I identified this case as one in which one of the issues was not reached by one set of
justices. Rogers, 79 Ky. L. J. at 449 n.27 (cited in note 3).
Stearns identifies the relevant issues in Kassel slightly differently: (X) whether a rational
basis test applies, and (Y) whether the court can look at trial evidence. Stearns, 103 Yale L. J.
at 1256-57 (cited in note 27); Stearns, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 320-21 (cited in note 71). As under
my characterization of the issues in Kassel, all justices presumably agreed that if both X and Y
were the law, then the statute should be upheld (R). Justice Powell and three others disagreed
with X, Justice Brennan, writing for two justices, disagreed with Y, so a majority of six voted to
strike the statute (not-R). Justice Rehnquist, writing for three justices, agreed with both X and
Y and therefore voted in dissent to uphold the statute (R). So far this is the same result as
under my characterization of Kassel. But Stearns reads Justice Brennan's concurrence as
accepting X (a rational basis test applies) rather than not deciding X. Stearns, 144 U. Pa. L.
Rev. at 321 (cited in note 71). The difference does not affect either Stearns's point or my
critique. It does serve as an example, however, of the differences that will have to be resolved in
any system that contemplates issue voting.
Under Stearns's characterization of Kassel, it is exactly parallel to Tidewater. (Under
Tidewater--X Article I does not support the statute, (Y) Article III does not support the
statute, and (R) strike the statute-all justices agreed that X and Y implied R. But only a
minority, the dissent, accepted both X and Y, so R was rejected, and the statute was upheld.
See text accompanying notes 12-16.
106. In discussing Kassel, Stearns asserted that "[to see the Condorcet winner" we should
count the votes on each constituent issue and conclude that the position taken by the dissent
"would have prevailed" by doing so. Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at 1257 (cited in note 27). "Thus
Supreme Court voting procedures did not identify the Condorcet winner in this case." Id.
Outcome voting "will sometimes, as in Kassel, miss a Condorcet winner." Id. at 1266-67.
Stearns now agrees that the dissent in Kassel was not a Condorcet winner. Stearns, 144 U. Pa.
L. Rev. at 321 n.49 (cited in note 71). But see Stearns, 83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1335 (cited in note 71)
(stating that decisional processes of appellate courts "fail[] to ensure that available Condorcet
winners prevail"); id. at 1338 C'Supreme Court decisionmaking ... is not structured to ensure
that available Condorcet winners prevail"); id. at 1342-43 (arguing a voting procedure that
ensures a decision is "arbitrary and irrational" because "a present majority will prefer an
available alternative, thus rendering the outcome inconsistent with the notion of majority
rule").
107. Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at 1257 (cited in note 27).
108. I have used Tidewater to keep the number of different examples in this piece from
unnecessarily proliferating. In this context Kassel as characterized by Stearns is indistinguish-
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This of course does not follow. The problem is that what is
chosen encompasses two different things: the legal reasoning and the
outcome. Judges can agree on the outcome and disagree on the legal
reasoning. In appellate cases the outcomes are typically presented
pairwise in the sense that the choice of outcome is limited to "affirm"
or "reverse." But the choice of legal reasoning for the outcome is not
restrained in the same sense and certainly not on a pairwise basis.
The outcome in Tidewater, for instance, was either "the statute is
constitutional and the district court has jurisdiction" or "the statute is
not constitutional and the district court has no jurisdiction." The
legal reasoning, on the other hand, that leads to one or the other
conclusion, could consist of a broad number of possible combinations
of the issues listed above. 10 9
Even if we limit the issues to those suggested (Article I does or
does not authorize the statute, Article III does or does not authorize
the statute), the conclusion that the dissent's outcome is the
Condorcet winner could not follow. The first set of choices consists of
the following: (a) Article I does not authorize the statute, or (b)
Article I does authorize the statute. The second set of choices does
not include either one of the first two, but instead consists of two
entirely different choices: (c) Article III does not authorize the
statute, or (d) Article III does authorize the statute.
Now if six justices prefer a to b in pairwise contests, and six
justices prefer c to d in pairwise contests, how can it be said that
either a or c is the Condorcet winner? Even to ask the question would
require that either a or c be one of the choices in both of the pairwise
contests. That is not true of either a or c. Stearns seemed to suggest
that the Condorcet winner is (e) neither Article I nor Article III
authorizes the statute. But e is not the equivalent of any one of a, b,
c, or d. Indeed, in a pairwise contest between e and (f) Article I or
Article III authorizes the statute, it is clear that f is selected by a
majority of justices."10
able from Tidewater. See note 105. Using the Kassel example, the argument would be as
follows: if all justices are given only the pairwise choice that the rational basis test should or
should not be used, a majority will prefer that the rational basis test should be used. If all
justices are given only the pairwise choice that trial evidence can or cannot be used, a majority
will prefer that trial evidence can be considered. So the Condorcet winner is that the rational
basis test should be used and trial evidence can be considered, since that is the preference of a
majority of decision makers when the choices are given pairwise.
109. See text accompanying notes 34-35.
110. If we use Professor Stearns's Kassel example, the analysis would look like this. Even
if we limit the issues to those suggested (the rational basis test is or is not applicable, trial evi-
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Such an analysis is confusing because it assumes that a
Condorcet winner is the outcome preference (or result preference or
remedy preference) after pairwise votes on issue preferences. This
mixes apples with oranges., Of course if there are pairwise votes on
outcomes, the majority result wins, and the dissent's position can
hardly be called the Condorcet winner. And there really is no way to
talk meaningfully about pairwise voting on issues decided by a court.
The yes-or-no preference with regard to one issue is simply not one of
the preferences with regard to a different issue.
More recently Stearns has argued not that outcome voting
misses a Condorcet winner in cases like Tidewater and Kassel, but
that because there is no Condorcet winner in such cases, the Court
must engage in outcome voting to avoid the endless cycling that would
result from issue voting.12  Here is how this argument goes, again
using the Tidewater rather than the Kassel example. In a first pair-
wise vote, a majority votes that Article I does not authorize the stat-
ute. That is, of the following two, a wins: (a) Article I does not
authorize the statute, or (b) Article I does authorize the statute. In a
second pairwise vote, a majority votes that Article III does not
authorize the statute. That is, of the following two, c wins: (c) Article
III does not authorize the statute, or (d) Article III does authorize the
statute. Finally, in a third pairwise vote, a majority votes that the
statute is constitutional. That is, a majority prefers f over e: (e) the
Constitution does not authorize the statute, or (f) the Constitution
authorizes the statute. Given these three majorities, "if the Court
employed a Condorcet-producing voting rule, for example, an
dence should or should not be considered), the conclusion that the dissent's outcome is the
Condorcet winner could not follow. The first set of two choices consists of the following: (a) the
rational basis test is applicable, or (b) the rational basis test is not applicable. The second set of
choices does not include either one of the first two, but instead includes two entirely different
choices: (c) trial evidence should be considered, or (d) trial evidence should not be considered.
Now if six justices prefer a to b in pairwise contests, and six justices prefer c to d in pairwise
contests, how can it be said that either a or c is the Condorcet winner? Even to ask the question
would require that either a or c be one of the choices in both of the pairwise contests. That is
not true of either a or c. Stearns seemed to suggest that the Condorcet winner is (e) the rational
basis test is applicable and trial evidence should be considered. But e is not the equivalent of
any one of a, b, c, or d. Indeed, in a pairwise contest between e and (f) the rational basis test is
not applicable or trial evidence should not be considered, it is clear that f is selected by a
majority of justices.
111. This confusion is particularly obvious in Stearns's standing example, where reasons
are mixed with results with abandon. See Stearns, 83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1339 & n.102, 1341-42
(cited in note 71).
112. Stearns, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 322 (cited in note 71). See also id. at 361 n.161 C'1f the
Court as a whole lacks a Condorcet-winning preference, it will be forced to issue an opinion that
a present majority of its members may disfavor relative to an available alternative").
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unlimited motion-and-amendment procedure, it would cycle."113
Stearns goes on:
To avoid this problem and to ensure that it can resolve all cases properly
before it, the Supreme Court, along with virtually all appellate courts, employs
case-by-case decisionmaking [in other words, outcome voting], even though
that rule, as in Kassel, sometimes thwarts the preferences of a majority of the
Court's members on an issue-by-issue basis.
114
This argument is more sophisticated, and on its face supports
outcome voting, yet it is similarly flawed. The example used is not
one in which issue voting is used, but one in which the Court goes
back and forth between issue voting and outcome voting. The first
two votes in the example are issue votes, and the third vote is an
outcome vote. Of course you will get different results if you switch
voting protocols in mid-stream!
On the contrary, the possibility of cycling is not affected by
whether a system of issue voting or outcome voting is used. Under
outcome voting the majority of outcome votes determines the case.
And under issue voting, if we accept the assumptions of issue voting
advocates (that issues can be agreeably identified and voted upon
separately as they arise), then there is no reason to expect cycling
with respect to how issues are decided. Nor is there any greater
likelihood of cycling with respect to outcomes under issue voting: in
cases like Tidewater and Kassel, the dissent's preferred outcome will
simply prevail.
Also, if we distinguish carefully between reason and result, it
makes no sense in such cases to say that there is no Condorcet
winner. There is no way to know how a series of pairwise votes on the
same set of issue-choices would turn out, since that is not what we are
presented with in Tidewater or Kassel. Instead we have a series of
pairwise votes on separate issues. So if we are talking issues, we
113. Id. at 323. Here is how this argument goes in Stearns's terms, using his Kassel
example. In a first pairwise vote, a majority votes that the rational basis test is applicable.
That is, of the following two, a wins: (a) the rational basis test is applicable, or (b) the rational
basis test is not applicable. In a second pairwise vote, a majority votes that Article III does not
authorize the statute. That is, of the following two, c wins: (c) trial evidence should be
considered, or (d) trial evidence should not be considered. Finally, in a third pairwise vote, a
majority votes that the statute is not constitutional. That is, a majority prefers f over e: (e) the
state statute does not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, or (f) the state statute does
violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. Given precisely these three majorities, Stearns argues
that "if the Court employed a Condorcet-producing voting rule, for example, an unlimited




cannot tell whether there is a Condorcet winner or not. It is as if in
our abstract examples we were told only-Person 1: A,B; Person 2:
C,D; Person 3: E,F. This is not enough information to know which
preference is the Condorcet winner, or indeed whether there is one.
In contrast, if we focus on outcomes, then as demonstrated above,
under outcome voting even in cases like Tidewater and Kassel the
clear Condorcet winner was the side that actually won, since a
majority of justices supported that outcome over its (one) alternative.
In other words, if we focus on outcomes, then neither issue
voting nor outcome voting is more likely to miss Condorcet (outcome)
winners. Moreover, outcomes will not cycle under either voting rule.
And if we focus on issues, then neither issue voting nor outcome
voting is more likely to miss Condorcet (issue) winners. Similarly,
issue resolutions are no more likely to cycle under either voting rule.
It is only by mixing issues and outcomes in one example that a
contrary conclusion can be reached.
The mixing of reason and result in the Condorcet analysis of
cases like Tidewater permits misunderstanding of some points I have
made. For instance, Stearns has referred to cases like Tidewater and
Kassel as three-remedy cases.115 By three-remedy cases I meant a
different category of cases-those with three possible outcomes on
appeal. 116 This does not occur often, since usually an appellate court
has the two choices of affirm or reverse. But on occasion the
reasoning of each of three groups of justices may lead to three
different outcomes, such as affirm, remand, or reverse. In this
situation we may have a true possibility of cycling or inability of the
multimember institution to reach a result. This possibility does
derive from the system of pure outcome voting, coupled with majority
voting by a multimember court. In this situation justices have on
occasion departed from pure outcome voting because of the overriding
requirement for the Supreme Court to make a decision. In 1991, I
could find only five cases like this;117 there has since been another.118
Each time a justice whose reasoning led to one of the polar positions
voted instead for the middle position, that is, for instance, to remand
rather than to affirm or reverse. This is the same result that would
115. See, for example, Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at 1266 n.176 (cited in note 27) (referring to
my discussion of Union Gas and Fulminante, which are indistinguishable in this context from
Tidewater and Kassel, in connection with his curious characterization of such cases as three-
remedy cases).
116. Rogers, 79 Ky. L. J. at 459-61 (cited in note 3).
117. See note 4.
118. See Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal Communications Commission, 114 S. Ct.
2445, 2475 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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occur if each of the justices were presented separately with the choice
of affirm or remand and the choice of reverse or remand. So we can
say that remand was the Condorcet winner in such cases. 119 Thus in
the situation where there are more than two outcomes, the system
already now reaches the Condorcet winner.
This is simply not the problem in Tidewater, Kassel (Stearns's
example), Wyman-Gordon (my earlier example), my criminal proce-
dure example, or any incoherent-rule case resulting from differently
constituted majorities on subissues. In Tidewater the choices were to
uphold or invalidate the jurisdictional statute. In Kassel the choices
were to uphold or invalidate Iowa's truck-size statute. In Wyman-
Gordon the choices were to uphold or reverse the NLRB decision to
require addresses. In the criminal procedure case the choices were to
uphold the conviction or to require a retrial. In none of these situ-
ations was there a third choice advocated by any justice. These are
simply not three-remedy cases. There is no way the dissent's pre-.
ferred outcome in these cases can be characterized as the Condorcet
winner. The dissenting positions in each of these cases is a winner
only if one assumes issue voting. The dissenting position in these
cases may be called the issue-voting winner, but that obviously adds
nothing to the argument that issue voting is appropriate. Nor can it
be said that there is no Condorcet winner. All that can be said is that
the outcome winner is determined by whether issue voting or outcome
voting is used.
At one point Stearns approaches yet another way to apply
Condorcet analysis to cases like Tidewater: to view the preferences
not as issues of law, nor as outcomes, but as legal regimes that
include more than one outcome. 120 For instance, Stearns hypothesizes
a case in which three justices support each of the following three
constitutional sets (really pairs) of principles:21
119. This conclusion is based on the highly likely, but admittedly not certain, assumption
that a justice whose first choice is affirmance will prefer remand to reversal, and that a justice
whose first choice is reversal will prefer remand to affirmance.
120. My distinctions among reason, result (outcome), and regime (set of outcomes) corre-
sponds to Professor Kornhauser's carefully defined distinction among reason, result, and rule.
See Kornhauser, 12 Intl. Rev. Law & Econ. at 174-75 (cited in note 96). Writing separately at
that point, Kornhauser noted that "[w]hile choices among results are 'naturally' binary, the
choice among rules is not." Id. at 177.
121. Stearns, 83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1345-46 (cited in note 71).
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(A) (not-Flast 122) there is no taxpayer standing to challenge
governmental benefits to religion in the form of monetary
grants, and (Valley Forge) there is no taxpayer standing to
challenge governmental benefits to religion in the form of
property grants;
(B) (Mast) there is taxpayer standing to challenge
governmental benefits to religion in the form of money grants,
and (not-Valley Forge) there is taxpayer standing to challenge
governmental benefits to religion in the form of property grants;
or
(C) (Flast) there is taxpayer standing to challenge
governmental benefits to religion in the form of money grants,
and (Valley Forge) there is no taxpayer standing to challenge
governmental benefits to religion in the form of property grants.
To avoid stare decisis considerations, Stearns hypothesizes
that neither type of grant has reached the Supreme Court before, and
that taxpayer standing cases of each type (property and monetary) are
decided by the Court simultaneously. If we think in terms of out-
comes, then for each case there are only two choices: standing exists
or not. There will be standing for the money challenge and not for the
property challenge, and there is no Condorcet problem regarding the
outcome in either the monetary or the property case.
However, if we view the above three possible legal regimes, or
pairs of outcomes, as preferences, we can hypothesize their rank
ordering for various justices in a way that would raise the Condorcet
paradox. If Flast versus not-Flast and Valley Forge versus not-Valley
Forge are voted upon in two separate cases without regard to stare
decisis, the winning legal regime is clearly C.123 It is perhaps likely
122. The names Flast and Valley Forge reflect that these positions may roughly reflect the
holdings of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), and Valley Forge College v. Americans United,
454 U.S. 464 (1982).
123. Professor Stearns confuses the matter somewhat by treating a fourth proposition--
taxpayer standing to challenge governmental benefits to religion should be present or not
regardless of whether the government grants money or property-as if it were another outcome
to be voted upon. Stearns, 83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1346 (cited in note 71). This is not really an
outcome of the same order as Flast versus not-Fast or Valley Forge versus not-Valley Forge,
since it will not decide a taxpayer standing case without either of those outcomes having already
been determined. Another way of stating choice X is: (X) either (Flast) there is taxpayer
standing to challenge monetary grants, and (not-Valley Forge) there is taxpayer standing to
challenge property grants; or (not Fast) there is no taxpayer standing to challenge monetary
grants and (Valley Forge) there is no taxpayer standing to challenge property grants. So stated,
X clearly does not by itself answer whether there is standing in the case of a particular
governmental benefit to religion. Thus, X is not an outcome but ultimately just an issue. Thus
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that C will be the legal regime that will be the Condorcet-winning
legal regime, since in all probability C is preferable to the remaining
regime choice for each of the justices preferring A or B. It is only in
the unlikely event that some justices who prefer A would, given the
choice of B or C, prefer B (or instead that some justices who prefer B
would, given the choice of A or C, prefer A) that we can say in some
sense there is no Condorcet winner. 124 But as I now demonstrate, all
of this is true regardless of whether we use issue voting or outcome
voting. 125 To demonstrate this, we must examine which regime
results under issue voting and outcome voting.
First, let us take issue voting. We can arrive at the regime
preferences hypothesized above by assuming that the two relevant
subissues are:
(Y) taxpayer standing is based on the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment (assume 3 justices say yes, 6 say
no); or
(Z) taxpayer standing is based on the Taxing and
Spending Clause of Article I (assume 3 justices say yes, 6 say
no).
Assume for simplicity purposes that taxpayers challenging
monetary grants to religion might rely for standing on the
Establishment Clause or the Taxing and Spending Clause, but that
taxpayers challenging property grants to religion could only rely on
the Establishment Clause. Assume that only three justices agree
with Y and only three justices agree with Z,126 and all justices agree
that without holding Y or Z there can be no taxpayer standing. In
such a situation there will be six votes for standing when there is a
governmental grant of money to religion (those who prefer regime B
or C above), but only three votes for standing when there is a
governmental grant of property to religion (those who prefer regime B
above). In other words, my assumed allocation of issue preferences
would lead to the regime preferences hypothesized by Stearns.
when Stearns intersperses votes on Fast versus not-Flast, Valley Forge versus not-Valley Forge,
and X versus not-X, he is again mixing votes on outcomes with votes on issues.
124. See note 130.
125. Indeed, outcome voting, as we shall see, is somewhat more likely to lead to C.
126. These assumptions are entirely hypothetical, and not based even loosely on the actual
positions of justices in cases like Flast and Valley Forge. See note 122.
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Now there are two possible actual cases: grant of money (two
issues, because there are two possible constitutional bases for stand-
ing), and grant of property (single issue, because there is only one
possible constitutional basis for standing).127  Under issue voting,
there would be no standing in either of these cases because (6-3) the
Establishment Clause does not support standing and (6-3) the Taxing
and Spending Clause does not support standing. Thus the regime
under issue voting would be A.
Under outcome voting, if the property-only, or single-issue,
case arose first, even assuming stare decisis, the regime selected by
the Court as a whole would be A. That is, the Court would vote 6-3
against standing because the Establishment Clause would, without
considering the Taxing and Spending Clause, only get three votes for
standing. In the subsequent money-grant, double-issue case the dis-
senting votes in the previous case will then be bound by stare decisis
to vote without relying on the Establishment Clause, and will thus
vote against standing. But if the double-issue money-grant case arose
first, the ultimate regime will be C, since in the money-grant case
there will be standing (plurality on the Establishment Clause plus
concurrence on the Taxing and Spending Clause); but in the
subsequent single-issue property-grant case there will be only three
votes for standing (the three who rely on the Establishment Clause).128
The bottom line is that under issue voting the regime is A,
which is the first choice of only a minority; and under outcome voting
the regime is either C or A, depending on the sequence of cases pre-
sented. 129 But neither C nor A is the majority's first preference for a
legal regime. We can only say that regime C or regime A is the
Condorcet choice if regime C or regime A would prevail over the other
regime choices in pairwise contests. But there is no way to ascertain
whether issue voting or outcome voting is more likely to reach a
Condorcet-winning regime because there is no way to rank the jus-
tices' preferences among regimes A, B, and C. This is true because
justices do not tell us which regime they prefer. Instead, justices tell
us how they vote on outcomes and how they resolve some issues.
Indeed, justices rarely describe how they would vote on another case if
127. To make the parallel with Tidewater and Kassel complete, we would have to hypothe-
size another single-issue case: a taxpayer challenge to governmental spending not based on the
Establishment Clause. Since such a case would not govern one of the outcomes paired by
Stearns, I leave this possibility aside.
128. Also, if we assume no stare decisis, the regime selected by the Court as a whole will be
C, regardless of the sequence of the cases.
129. In neither case would there be cycling. See Kornhauser, 12 Intl. Rev. L. & Econ. at
179 (cited in note 96) ("[Rlule-bound adjudication does not lead to cycling on majority courts").
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their own position in the instant case were rejected. Without this
description, however, we have no way of knowing whether C or A is a
Condorcet-winning regime.130 It follows that issue voting is no more
productive of Condorcet-winning regimes than outcome voting.131
130. Hazarding a guess, however, I think that C (a possibility under outcome voting) would
more likely be the Condorcet winner than A (the only possibility under issue voting), since C is
the regime that in some sense is in the "middle" position. This guess is based on the reasonable,
but not certain, assumptions that a justice whose first choice is standing in neither situation
will prefer standing in one situation to standing in both, and that a justice whose first choice is
standing in both situations will prefer standing in one to standing in neither. For an analysis of
how a judge might make such a decision, see id. at 176.
131. In his reply to this piece, Professor Stearns states repeatedly that I misunderstand the
terms Condorcet winner and Condorcet-producing rule. In fact he nowhere shows that I have
used either term differently from the meaning that he ascribes to those terms: a Condorcet
winner is an alternative that defeats all available alternatives in unlimited pairwise contests.
Instead he assumes that I have misunderstood the terms because he cannot accept the criticism
that by mixing issues and outcomes he has confused the pool of preference choices to which the
Condorcet criterion may usefully be applied.
To find a cycle in outcome voting, and thereby to say that outcome voting is not a Condorcet-
producing rule, Stearns treats the outcome vote as just another issue vote. To do this he treats
the overall issue in Tidewater (my "issue" A: whether the statute is constitutional) as one of
three preferences, and he then treats my subissues B and C as the other two. According to
Stearns, since votes on these three issues will cycle, outcome-voting is non-Condorcet producing.
See Stearns, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1053-54 (cited in note 37).
This is a double non sequitur. First, with respect to his treatment of the outcome determi-
nation as just another issue, his point is purely semantic. Sure, in every case we can state the
issue at a sufficient level of generality as to render the answer equal to the outcome. (An
extreme example of such a legal "issue" that is present in every case is "should a plaintiff
recover on the facts of this case?'). Voting on such an issue is identical to outcome voting. The
difference between Professors Post, Salop, Kornhauser, and Sager and me is whether the vote
should be on that highly general, single issue or on subissues. So we could say my dispute with
Post, Salop, Kornhauser, and Sager is really between "global issue voting" and "subissue
voting." I think it is clearer to use the terms "outcome voting" and "issue voting," but it really
does not matter. All of my arguments apply regardless of which terminology we use. If I say
Stearns is mixing outcomes with issues in comparing the effects of outcome and issue voting, it
is no answer to say that he is really only mixing global issues with subissues. It is still mixing
the types of voting that we are all comparing. Second, treating the outcome as an issue only
shows that issue voting cycles, not that outcome voting cycles.
Stearns's reply is really just an over-formalization of a simple point: outcome voting can
lead to a different result than issue voting. If "should the plaintiff win.' is an issue that can be
voted upon under issue voting, then issue voting would certainly be indeterminate, but voting
on that issue is what Post, Salop, Kornhauser, and Sager are arguing against. Post and Salop
argue that the vote should always be on subissues, and Kornhauser and Sager argue that it
should sometimes be. If the voting can go back and forth, then of course the voted-upon
answers will be different, and one could call that cycling. But no one advocates going back and
forth in that fashion.
In short, Stearns has nowhere demonstrated that outcome voting is not a Condorcet-
producing rule, despite his repeated assertions to that effect. The fact that in the end he sup-
ports outcome voting does not mean that his negative characterization of outcome voting (as a
non-Condorcet-producing rule) is valid.
At one point Stearns says that I might make some arguments that I do not make (for
example, "[issue] voting can only take place at one level," "in a given vertical path, we must stay
at a single level"), and then essentially uses my arguments to refute them! Compare Stearns,
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VI. CONCLUSION
With remarkable continuity, justices of the Supreme Court of
the United States have voted on the basis of their own individual
analysis of the law. While such individual analyses may have prop-
erly included deference to previous decisions with which they may
have disagreed (stare decisis), justices have not voted against the
result of their own current analysis because a majority of colleagues
disagrees on a subissue. A logical exception to this practice is com-
pelled by the necessity that the Court make a decision in cases where
there are more than two possible outcomes on appeal. The three
other known times 3 2 when supreme court justices have deviated from
the otherwise universal practice must be considered anomalies. To
urge that this anomalous practice be accepted wholesale is to wish
upon the law a radically indeterminate basis for deciding cases.
Advocates of issue voting may assume agreement on how issues
should be divided, but the assumption is completely unwarranted.
Issues in cases can be divided in different ways to achieve different
results. Even if there were general agreement on how issues should
be divided, issue voting would lead to majorities of judges in real
cases having opposed the judgment of their own court. Who will be
responsible for such judgments?
The occasional incoherence in the law that results when multi-
member courts engage in outcome voting is not a problem that war-
rants such a remarkable cure. Outcome voting, even when it occa-
sionally leads to incoherence, never requires inconsistency. Outcome
voting is also fully consistent with stare decisis. Moreover, incoherent
results will naturally be uncommon. On one hand, where subissues
are related, or at least likely to arise in the same case, the incoherent
result is intuitively unobjectionable. 133  On the other hand, where
subissues are unlikely to occur in the same case, the possibility of an
49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1061 (cited in note 37), with text preceding note 36. Also, Stearns says that
I provide "not a single example" of his mixing issues with outcomes "with abandon." One need
only look to the pages of his article that I cited in note 111 for that statement. For instance,
Stearns describes the following series of hypothetical votes: Scalia moves an issue, Blackmun
moves an issue, Blackmun moves an outcome, O'Connor moves an issue with an outcome,
Blackmun moves two issues plus an outcome. Stearns, 83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1339 (cited in note 72).
Finally, the four (presumably worst) examples given by Stearns to demonstrate that I have
"substantially misrepresented" his work do not, upon any fair reading, support his charge. See
Stearns, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1056 n.45 (cited in note 37).
132. See notes 1, 2, and 4.
133. For instance, in Tidewater the majority believed-albeit on different grounds-that
the Constitution permitted Congress to grant federal courts the jurisdiction in question, and
that was the result.
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incoherent rule becoming the law is small and can be reduced by an
enlightened policy of discretionary review. For instance, the Supreme
Court could easily grant certiorari on only one of the two independent
issues should both of them arise for the first time in the same case.
Finally, it is misleading and incorrect to say that issue voting
is any more likely than outcome voting to lead to a Condorcet winner.
Indeed, outcome voting is just as likely as issue voting to produce a
Condorcet winner, regardless of whether the pool of preferences we




Outline of the Justices' Opinions in National Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co.
(Parenthetical numbers indicate page numbers in 337 U.S. (1949).)
(Bold letters indicate issues listed in text accompanying notes 33-35.)
Jackson (with Black and Burton, 3 votes)
I. A statute giving federal court jurisdiction over controversies be-
tween D.C. citizens and citizens of a state is within the constitu-
tional power of Congress. (600, 604) (A)
A. The relevant constitutional provisions should not be given a
strict interpretation. (585-86) (D)
1. Fundamental rights are not involved. (585)
B. A D.C. citizen is not a citizen of a "State" under Article III.
(588) (B)
1. Dictum of Marshall in Hepburn should be deferred to. (586-
87, 582)
2. It is unlikely the Framers intended "State" to have
different meanings in the Constitution. (587-88) (K, L)
C. The statute can be based on Congress's power to legislate for
D.C. (589, 600) (C)
1. This conclusion is consistent with Hepburn. (588-89) (H)
2. The justiciability limits on federal courts do not derive from
Article III. (590-91) (M)
3. Some Article III courts exert non-Article III power. (591-92)
(C)
a. D.C. federal courts have the power to carry out legisla-
tive and administrative acts and this is not limited to
D.C. (590, 592) (N)
b. District courts exercise Article I power when they enter-
tain suits against the U.S. (592-94) (0)
c. District courts exercise Article I power when they hear
bankruptcy trustee suits arising under state law. (594-
96, 599) (P)
i. In order for a case to arise under federal law for
constitutional purposes, federal law must be an ele-
ment in the cause of action. (596-99) (Q)
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D. The result is fair ("less harsh"; contrary holding has "no justifi-
cation"). (602-03) (F)
1. The result is only formally different from a D.C. federal
court exercising nationwide process. (601-03)
E. There is no express prohibition of this type grant of jurisdic-
tion. (603)
F. Deference to Congress is appropriate. (603) (J)
Rutledge (with Murphy, 2 votes)
I. A statute giving federal court jurisdiction over controversies be-
tween D.C. citizens and citizens of a state is within the constitu-
tional power of Congress. (A)
A. Hepburn requires a different answer. (604-08) (H)
1. Article III is a limit on the power of Congress to confer
jurisdiction on federal courts. (607) (C)
a. If Congress can override the limits of Article III, then
Article III illogically limits nothing. (605, 607)
b. The rationale for giving D.C. federal courts the power to
carry out legislative and administrative acts is limited
to federal courts sitting in D.C. (608-09) (N)
c. District courts exercise Article III federal question
power when they entertain suits against the U.S. (609-
10) (0)
d. District courts exercise Article I power when they hear
bankruptcy cases arising under state law. (611) (P)
i. Such cases are part of a congeries of cases, other
ones of which are clearly federal question cases.
(611)
ii. In order for a case to arise under federal law for
constitutional purposes, federal law need not neces-
sarily be an element in the cause of action. (613-15)
(Q)
e. The justiciability limit on federal courts derives from
Article III. (616) (M)
B. Hepburn should be overruled. (618, 624-26) (I)
1. Stare decisis is not as weighty in constitutional cases. (617
n.11)
2. A D.C. citizen can be considered a citizen of a "State" under
Article III. (619-25) (B)
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a. A broad (not "narrow and literal") interpretation of the
Constitution's words is appropriate. (620) (D)
i. Key words in different parts of the Constitution
have been interpreted differently. (620-21) (L)
ii. This case involves civil and not political rights. (623)
b. The Framers did not consider the issue. (621-22) (K)
c. The purpose of diversity jurisdiction in Article III does
not support Hepburn. (622-23)
d. The distinction in Hepburn is unfair ("highly unjust
discrimination"; "purposeless and indefensible"). (624-
25) (F)
3. The plurality's reasoning is inconsistent with Hepburn.
(626) (H)
Vinson (with Douglas, 2 votes)
I. A statute giving federal court jurisdiction over controversies be-
tween D.C. citizens and citizens of a state is outside the constitu-
tional power of Congress. (A)
A. Article III sets a limit on the power of Article III courts outside
D.C. (627-45) (C)
1. The justiciability limit on federal courts derives from
Article III. (628-29) (M)
2. Legislative history supports that Article III is a limit. (629,
631-36) (K)
3. Cases support that Article III is a limit. (629-30, 637-38)
4. The rationale for giving D.C. federal courts the power to
carry out legislative and administrative acts is limited to
federal courts sitting in D.C. (638-40) (N)
5. District courts exercise Article III federal question power
when they entertain suits against the U.S. (640 n.20, 641
n.21) (0)
6. The Supreme Court's appellate power to review legislative
courts is consistent with a holding that Article III sets a
limit. (642-43).
a. Legislative courts can hear cases of the same nature as
Article III cases. (641)
b. This does not lead to the incongruous result that Article
I courts are more powerful than Article III courts. (644)
i. Legislative courts are limited to Article I subjects
over which Congress can legislate. (644)
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ii. Perhaps some Article III cases cannot be taken by
legislative courts in the states. (644).
iii. Legislative courts may be limited to cases where a
court is not constitutionally necessary. (644)
7. Considerations of fairness ("expediency") should not super-
sede the intent of the Framers. (644-45) (G)
B. A D.C. citizen cannot be considered a citizen of a "State" under
Article III. (645-46) (B)
1. Article III contains an express limit and no express excep-
tion. (645) (K?)
2. Hepburn held that a D.C. citizen is not a citizen of a "State"
under Article III. (645) (H?)
3. A strict interpretation is appropriate. (645-46) (D)
a. The case is one regarding the mechanics of government,
and not one where experience can give content to consti-
tutional words. (645)
Frankfurter (with Reed, 2 votes)
I. A statute giving federal court jurisdiction over controversies be-
tween D.C. citizens and citizens of a state is outside the constitu-
tional power of Congress. (A)
A. Article III sets a limit on the power of Article III courts outside
D.C. (648-52) (C)
1. A strict interpretation is warranted. (647) (D)
a. The provisions are specific, precise, and technical-as
opposed to grand concepts. (646)
b. Fairness does not require a different result ("no great
public interest or libertarian principle is at stake").
(651) (F)
2. Article III limits were a needed safeguard to carry out a
policy of distrust of federal courts. (647) (K)
3. The justiciability limit on federal courts derives from
Article III. (648) (M)
4. Such limits apply regardless of currently perceived public
policy. (648-49) (G)
5. District courts exercise Article III federal question power
when they entertain suits against the U.S. (649) (0)
6. Cases support that Article III is a limit. (652)
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7. District courts exercise Article III power when they hear
bankruptcy trustee suits arising under state law. (652 n.3)
(P)
a. Such cases are part of a congeries of cases, other ones of
which are clearly federal question cases. (652 n.3)
B. A D.C. citizen cannot be considered a citizen of a "State" under
Article III. (652-55) (B)
1. The limits in Article III are express. (653)
2. The Constitution does not refer to D.C. as a "State." (653)
a. We should defer to the contemporary interpretation of
Justice Marshall. (653) (H?)
b. The Framers were able to express themselves precisely.
(653-54) (K)
3. Other constitutional provisions containing the word "State"
that have been held to apply to D.C. "do not depend on a le-
gal right relating solely to states." (654) (L)
4. No great deference is owed to Congress regarding the
meaning of the limits in Article III of the Constitution.
(655) (D)
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